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Introduction 
Once a great wrong has been done, it never dies. People speak 
the words of peace, but their hearts do not forgive. Generations 
perform ceremonies of reconciliation but there is no end. 
—Paule Marshall1 
 
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task. 
Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation’s childhood and 
adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years. 
—Justice Thurgood Marshall2 
 
These quotes from two Marshalls—one, a literary giant, and 
the other, a legal one—highlight the power of collective memory and 
racial bias to thwart remedial efforts eradicating discrimination. 
Their lamentations about the difficulties of reconciliation have 
modern-day application. For example, sixty-five years after the 
Supreme Court’s monumental decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education3 (Brown I), present-day commentators4 and even a 
 
 1. PAULE MARSHALL, Epigraph to THE CHOSEN PLACE, THE TIMELESS PEOPLE 
(Vintage Contemporaries 1984) (1969). 
 2. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND 
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 208 (2004) (“[T]he idea and vision 
animating Brown could not be farther from the reality of public education today. 
Indeed, we are not even living up to the repugnant principle established in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on the Significance of the 
Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 991, 994 (2004) 
(“Brown’s promise of quality, integrated schools has eluded most of its expected 
beneficiaries.”); Jerry Rosiek, School Segregation: A Realist’s View, PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN, Feb. 2019, at 8 (“[R]acial segregation has incrementally returned to U.S. 
schools over the last 30 years.”). 
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Supreme Court Justice5 almost unanimously conclude that Brown 
I’s promise of educational equity is as elusive today as it was in 
1954. This Article advances a theory about the elusiveness of Brown 
I’s promise using the analytical framework of transitional justice. 
Transitional justice is extraordinary justice triggered by transitions 
from repressive political regimes characterized by massive human 
rights violations to more democratic forms of government.6 Once 
triggered, it creates an imperative for comprehensive government 
sanctioned remedial efforts, such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions, to eradicate societal stereotypes and biases that 
justified the massive human rights violations of the predecessor 
regime.7 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I was the beginning of 
a transitional period in American education. The shift from Jim 
Crow segregation—a sociopolitical regime that nullified the 
mandates of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments and their promise of full legal inclusion for Black 
Americans—was no mundane political transition, but a radical, 
paradigmatic one triggering transitional justice. However, despite 
Brown I’s transitional character, the Court’s mandate to end 
segregation “with all deliberate speed” announced in Brown v. 
Board of Education8 (Brown II) and its judicially-fashioned remedy 
of integration did little to describe, to account for, or to establish a 
legal framework for correcting societal attitudes about Black 
intellectual inferiority that spawned the adoption of segregation as 
an educational policy.9 Consequently, American public schools 
remain in transition. A perennially transitional system of public 
education that burdens Black students with the yoke of an insidious 
stereotype injures all students and threatens the egalitarian ideals 
of public education. Consequently, extinguishing the stereotype of 
Black intellectual inferiority in American education remains “a 
long-ignored transitional justice project.”10 
 
 5. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 806 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In light of the evident risk of a return to school 
systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated, many school districts have 
felt a need to maintain or to extend their integration efforts.”). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I. 
 8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 9. See discussion infra Parts II–IV. 
 10. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Escaping the Circle by Confronting Classroom 
Stereotyping: A Step Toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of 
Children of Color, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 134, 137 (2004) [hereinafter 
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Given transitional justice’s broad remedial focus, changing the 
law without other efforts to rectify the psychic injuries inflicted by 
stereotypes and biases leaves victimized communities without an 
adequate remedy for government-sanctioned wrongdoing.11 Unlike 
retributive justice with its focus on punishing individual offenders 
or restorative justice with its focus on restoring relationships, 
transitional justice has a much broader remedial focus: societal 
transformation.12 To achieve social transformation, successor 
political regimes adopt a comprehensive agenda of transitional 
practices to address human rights violations, heal fragmented 
societies, and regain the credibility of their citizens.13 Scholars have 
not traditionally applied transitional justice’s broad remedial scope 
to established democracies, such as Australia, Canada, England, 
New Zealand, and the United States.14 Nevertheless, established 
 
Foehrenbach Brown]. 
 11. See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
 12. COLLEEN MURPHY, THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 8–10, 22–24, 83, 88–96 (2017); see also Fania Davis & Jonathan Scharrer, 
Reimagining and Restoring Justice: Toward a Truth and Reconciliation Process to 
Transform Violence Against African-Americans in the United States, in 
TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, LAWYERS, AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 89, 94, 97 (Marjorie 
A. Silver ed., 2017) (discussing the differences between restorative and retributive 
justice, and describing restorative justice as restoring harmony in fractured 
relationships); Catherine O’Rourke, The Shifting Signifier of “Community” in 
Transitional Justice: A Feminist Analysis, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 269, 271, 
282 (2008) (discussing generally the use of community-based transitional justice 
mechanisms). 
 13. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 17, 35; see also Olivia Ensign, Speaking Truth to 
Power: An Analysis of American Truth-Telling Efforts Vis-à-vis the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 1, 2 (2018) 
(discussing the various ways that societies use reconciliation in the aftermath of 
conflict to regain social cohesion and rebuild interpersonal relationships); Matiangai 
V. S. Sirleaf, The Truth About Truth Commissions: Why They Do Not Function 
Optimally in Post-Conflict Societies, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2263, 2265 (2014) 
(discussing generally transitional justice mechanisms and noting the unique 
characteristics of truth commissions). 
 14. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 31, 76–78; Davis & Scharrer, supra note 12, at 89, 
108 n.69 (noting the traditional definition of transitional justice and disagreement 
among scholars about whether its principles apply to societies not experiencing a 
political transition but that are still fractured by long-standing and pervasive human 
rights violations); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Bridging the Chasm: Reconciliation’s 
Needed Implementation Fourth Step, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 109, 120–25 (2016) 
(surveying transitional justice initiatives in established democracies); Joanna R. 
Quinn, Whither the “Transition” of Transitional Justice?, 8 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. 
L. 63, 63–66, 75–78 (2015) (noting the traditional conception of transitional justice 
as excluding democratic societies such as the United States and Canada but 
discussing the expansion of transitional justice principles by various scholars 
challenging the assumption that its principles are inapplicable to settled 
democracies and the ensuing debate over the elasticity of the meaning of transition). 
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democracies that remain fractured by long-standing, pervasive civil 
rights violations against historically marginalized groups have 
wholeheartedly endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives.15 
Despite the proliferation of these initiatives in other democratic 
countries, the United States government has taken a piecemeal 
approach to addressing its history of wrongdoing against Black 
Americans and other historically marginalized communities, 
relying on the rule of law as the exclusive vehicle for eradicating 
stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority. However, 
connecting Black Americans’ quest for educational equity to the 
larger struggle for international human rights will bring a fresh 
perspective to contemporary discussions about the elusiveness of 
Brown’s unfulfilled promises and equip education reformers with 
an arsenal of transitional justice practices to tackle stereotypes of 
Black intellectual inferiority at the root of systemic inequalities in 
public education. 
This Article builds upon prior applications of transitional 
justice principles to the desegregation of the United States’ public 
schools in two substantial ways.16 First, it incorporates normative 
understandings of transitional justice that have emerged since 
these initial scholarly insights. Second, it substantiates the validity 
of the comparison and then moves beyond theoretical 
considerations to more practical applications. This Article proceeds 
in four remaining parts. Part I outlines some central transitional 
justice tenets and their modern-day application to stable 
democracies. Part II argues that Brown I triggered the beginning of 
 
 15. Ensign, supra note 13, at 3, 42–44 (discussing various transitional justice 
initiatives in the United States such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the 
Greensboro, North Carolina Truth and Reconciliation Commission and noting a 
recent spike in grassroots models of truth-telling embracing transitional justice 
principles in the United States); Heather Parker, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions: A Needed Force in Alaska?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 29 (2017) (noting 
the expansion of transitional justice initiatives to settled democracies such as the 
United States to acknowledge slavery, racism, and the treatment of various minority 
populations); Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 112; see also discussion infra Section 
I.B (discussing other notable domestic transitional justice initiatives). 
 16. See Ensign, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that the Court’s decision in Brown I 
“created a possibility for national dialogue and healing that never took place” but not 
specifically linking the absence of dialogue to stereotypes of Black intellectual 
inferiority or to the concept of transitional justice); Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 
10, at 137–38 (describing the lack of efforts to extinguish the stereotype of Black 
intellectual inferiority as a “long-ignored transitional justice project,” and discussing 
the nation’s failure “to attend to the complicated details of transitional justice[,]” and 
indicating that “neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts and education policy 
makers charged with implementing [Brown] have devoted adequate attention to the 
challenge of translating [Brown’s] legal norm into an operational reality”). 
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a transitional period in American society and its system of public 
education and then critiques the transitional deficiencies in the 
Supreme Court’s desegregation jurisprudence. The last two sections 
connect the past to the present. Part III discusses some of the 
present-day educational consequences of these transitional 
deficiencies, and the conclusion proposes a preliminary framework 
acknowledging the legacy and dangers of racial stereotyping in 
American education.17 
I. Transitional Justice Primer: Central Tenets, Prevalent 
Practices, and Modern-Day Applications 
 
The past is never dead. It’s not even past. 
—William Faulkner18 
 
Transitional justice did not emerge as a remedial discipline 
until decades after key sociopolitical flashpoints in American 
history, such as slavery, reconstruction, and the beginning of Jim 
Crow segregation.19 However, one of its central tenets—cultivating 
a set of social values that will make the recurrence of massive 
human rights violations virtually impossible20—is endemic to 
societies, such as the United States, that still struggle with racial 
divisions caused by 250 years of slavery and 90 years of Jim Crow 
segregation. Transitional justice has its origins in the unification of 
post-World War II Europe and its more recent application to the 
political upheavals in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s after decades of repressive 
communist rule and massive human rights violations.21 In 
transitional societies, the successor regime’s goal is to reconcile a 
society deeply divided by the human rights atrocities committed by 
the predecessor regime.22 Reconciliation is inextricably linked to 
 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. The broad outline of this initial framework will 
be developed in this article, leaving a more detailed analysis to a subsequent article. 
 18. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951). 
 19. See discussion infra Section I.A (attributing the field transitional justice to 
New York Law School Professor Ruti Teitel). 
 20. See James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Creation of a Human 
Rights Culture in South Africa, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 5 (2004) (discussing the 
reconciliatory goals of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee). 
 21. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 76 
(2003) (describing various phases of transitional justice). 
 22. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (2002) (describing transitional 
justice as broader than political revolution and as “a shift in political orders”); What 
is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Apr. 25, 2011), 
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societal transformation.23 According to noted transitional justice 
scholar Colleen Murphy, societal transformation is rooted in 
relationships and it demands a radical overhaul of the basic terms 
of interaction between citizens, officials, and institutions so that 
such relationships are no longer structurally unequal.24 Eric 
Yamamoto, another noted transitional justice scholar, also 
emphasizes the relational aspect of reconciliation, remarking that 
“[i]n practice, repairing the breach—or reconciling—means salving 
psychological and economic wounds by lifting barriers to liberty and 
equality in education, housing, medical care, employment, cultural 
preservation, and political governance.”25 A major obstacle to 
societal transformation is pervasive structural inequality which 
Murphy defines as “the ways in which life prospects for individuals 
are fundamentally shaped by the institutional rules and norms that 
govern a society and that shape and constrain individual action.”26 
Given the relational aspect of reconciliation, societal 
transformation hinges on the successor regime’s ability to use 
memory, narrative, and historical accounting to rebuild a shared 
societal consensus that forms the foundation of a new government.27 
To rebuild societal consensus, the government assumes the 
responsibility for shaping a national, collective memory of past 
political repression to discredit the stereotypes, assumptions, and 
ancient feuds that created the social context that tolerated 
widespread human rights violations.28 Consequently, in 
transitional societies, memory, narrative, and historical accounting 
are uniquely political ways to regain public trust in a highly 
fractured society and legitimize the successor regime.29 Transitional 
justice scholars have identified several practices that facilitate 
societal transformation.30 Common examples include transitional 
 
https://www.ictj.org/publication/what-transitional-justice [https://perma.cc/4NE2-V
CQP] (defining transitional justice as “a response to systematic or widespread 
violations of human rights” that “seeks recognition for victims and promotion of  
possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy”). 
 23. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 6, 11; TEITEL, supra note 22, at 6. 
 24. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 81, 119, 121, 160. 
 25. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 142. 
 26. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 43, 45. 
 27. TEITEL, supra note 22, at 5, 8 (discussing the important transitional roles 
that historical inquiry and narrative play in the workings of historical justice). 
 28. Id. at 69–71 (explaining that the foci of shared judgment that form the basis 
for a new social consensus are expected to emerge through historical accountings and 
the pivotal role law plays in shaping social memory). 
 29. Id. at 70. 
 30. See Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 137 (categorizing transitional 
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legal rules, criminal prosecutions, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, reparations, apologies, and museums.31 This section 
briefly outlines some of the most prevalent transitional justice 
practices and then explores the expansion of transitional justice 
principles to stable democracies. 
A. Transitional Justice Tenets and Prevalent Practices 
Developing and altering previously existing legal rules is a 
rudimentary transitional justice practice.32 Ruti Teitel, a 
preeminent scholar who authored one of the first published 
accounts of transitional justice, observed that “[i]n transition, the 
oft-shared [societal] frameworks—political, religious, social—are 
threatened; so it is the law, its framework and processes that in 
great part shapes collective memory.”33 To transform society, 
transitional legal rules assume a dualistic character that is 
simultaneously retrospective and prospective.34 Transitional legal 
rules are retrospective because they supply the requisite social 
context to dismantle laws that the predecessor regime enacted that 
either facilitated or tolerated human rights abuses.35 Transitional 
legal rules are also prospective because, in addition to repudiating 
these laws, they justify a new political order.36 This new political 
order is communicated to the public through transitional narratives 
embedded in judicial opinions and legislative initiatives that 
denounce the stereotypes, assumptions, and ancient feuds that led 
to widespread human rights abuses.37 Consequently, transitional 
legal rules are revolutionary; they eradicate previously established 
precedent, and, according to Teitel, are formulated “in politically 
 
justice mechanisms into the following categories: “assessment of responsibility for 
past wrongs, the assembly of a comprehensive historical account of past injustices, 
the implementation of mechanisms to repair past wrongs, and the development of a 
workable governmental order and legal framework that reconstitutes the relevant 
community on just terms”); What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 22. 
 31. Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2265 (discussing generally transitional justice 
mechanisms). 
 32. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 124. 
 33. TEITEL, supra note 22, at 71. 
 34. Id. at 11 (“There is a tension between the rule of law in transition as 
backward-looking and forward-looking, as settled versus dynamic.”). 
 35. See id. (describing the law in transitional times as a mediator or conduit from 
a system of illiberal rule to a new social order that is primarily democratic). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 70–71 (“Transitional historical narratives are produced through 
varying legal measures, such as the trials of the ancien[t] regimes, or bureaucratic 
bodies convened for these purposes, and still other legal responses that imply 
marshaling a factual predicate.”). 
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controversial areas, where the value of legal change is in tension 
with the value of adherence to the principle of settled legal 
precedent.”38 Due to the controversial nature of transformative 
legal rules, judges in transitional societies embrace a kind of 
activism that they might avoid in non-transitional periods.39 
Although cultivating transitional legal rules is often the first 
step toward societal transformation, truth and reconciliation 
commissions (TRCs) have emerged as the dominant transitional 
justice practice among contemporary transitional societies.40 TRCs 
are autonomous, non-judicial, and non-retributive bodies that 
investigate past human rights abuses and identify patterns of 
interaction among citizens and societal institutions that promoted 
the human rights abuses of the predecessor government.41 The 1995 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (SATRC) is the 
most famous example of a government-sponsored TRC.42 Headed by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the SATRC sought to bear witness to 
human rights violations, record the testimonials of victims, and in 
some cases, grant amnesty to perpetrators.43 When it was convened, 
the SATRC was the largest truth-telling initiative of its kind, 
resulting in more than 300 staff members, an annual budget of $18 
million, and a 7-year investigatory scope.44 The SATRC took the 
testimony of approximately 21,000 victims, received 7,112 amnesty 
applications, and granted amnesty in 849 cases.45 The SATRC was 
premised on historical accounting, the idea that societal 
transformation is facilitated by forgiveness, and reconciliation 
through truth-telling.46 However, the truth proclaimed by the 
 
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. Id. at 23–24. 
 40. See Patryk Labuda, Racial Reconciliation in Mississippi: An Evaluation of 
the Proposal to Establish a Mississippi Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 27 
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 30 (2011) (suggesting that disillusionment with 
criminal prosecution has resulted in the proliferation of truth-telling initiatives); 
Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2266–67. 
 41. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 11; Labuda, supra note 40, at 17. 
 42. Ensign, supra note 13, at 2; Parker, supra note 15, at 28; Sirleaf, supra note 
13, at 2287. 
 43. See Parker, supra note 15, at 42–43. 
 44. Rita Lenane, “It Doesn’t Seem Very Fair, Because We Were Here First”: 
Resolving the Sioux Nation Black Hills Land Dispute and the Potential for 
Restorative Justice to Facilitate Government-to-Government Negotiations, 16 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 651, 676 (2015). 
 45. Truth Commission: South Africa, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/pub
lications/1995/12/truth-commission-south-africa [https://perma.cc/SE7X-AC4E]. 
 46.  Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson, The Power of Truth: South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in Context, in COMMISSIONING THE PAST: 
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SATRC was, according to some critics, a socially constructed, 
bargained-for political exchange that sacrificed peace for justice.47 
Others criticized the absence of a reconciliatory framework and 
mechanisms for following up on the commission’s reparative 
directives.48 However, despite its critics, the SATRC is the 
paradigmatic transitional justice truth-telling initiative because of 
its carefully constructed methodology,49 comprehensive final report, 
and the clarity with which it defined truth.50 Sixty-eight countries, 
including South Korea (2000 and 2005), the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2003), Ecuador (2007), Kenya (2008), the Solomon Islands 
(2008), and Honduras (2009) have modeled their truth-telling 
initiatives on the SATRC.51 
B. Applying Transitional Justice Principles to Stable 
Democracies 
Transitional justice inspired initiatives have become popular 
in stable democracies, such as Canada and the United States. 
However, unlike the Canadian government, which has explicitly 
endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives,52 the United 
 
UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1, 10–
11 (2002). 
 47. See TEITEL, supra note 22, at 88–89 (providing a general critique of SATRC 
as brokering peace for the sake of political expediency and presenting a version of 
human rights atrocities that was more about political consensus than truth); Ensign, 
supra note 13, at 6 (noting perceived flaws such as the disproportionate 
representation of White South Africans and the Amnesty Committee’s acceptance of 
the perpetrators’ version of events, even when they contradicted the victims’ 
accounts); Labuda, supra note 40, at 30 (“In highlighting the identity of perpetrators 
while obscuring that of beneficiaries, the [SATRC created] a version of the truth 
which obscures the link between perpetrators and beneficiaries, and thus between 
racialised power and racialised privilege.”); Teitel, supra note 21, at 83. 
 48. See Yamamoto, et al., supra note 14, at 111 (summarizing some of the most 
salient critiques of the SATRC). 
 49. Labuda, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 50. Ensign, supra note 13, at 1–8 (distinguishing between the four distinctive 
kinds of truth promulgated by the SATRC); see also Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, 
at 140 (describing the SATRC as a template for subsequent truth-telling initiatives 
because of the clarity of its moral imperatives, its structure, and its deployment of 
language and imagery to build a common ground for groundbreaking political 
action). 
 51. Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2331 (citing TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 39 (2010)). 
 52. See Parker, supra note 15, at 53–57 (summarizing the work of the Canadian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission); Statement of Apology to Former Students of 




2020] Getting at the Root 11 
States government has taken an ambivalent, piecemeal approach to 
addressing government-sanctioned wrongdoing that normalized 
physical violence against Indigenous peoples and those of African 
descent and the psychological, cultural, and educational 
ramifications of that violence.53 Although not explicitly invoking the 
transitional justice moniker, these federally-endorsed 
reconciliatory initiatives can be easily summarized: (1) delayed, 
conditional apologies to Blacks for lynchings during the early 
twentieth century and for the atrocities of slavery and 
segregation,54 to Native Hawaiians for a government-endorsed coup 
of the sovereign Kingdom of Hawaii,55 and to Native Americans for 
decades of violence, theft, and mismanagement of tribal lands,56 (2) 
a National Museum of African-American History and Culture 
authorized by Congress after more than 100 years of private sector 
lobbying,57 (3) reparation payments to Japanese-American 
survivors of World War II internment camps,58 but the denial of 
 
  53. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 14 (denoting the large reconciliation 
chasm that still must be bridged in the United States); Kaimipono David Wenger, 
Apology Lite: Truths, Doubts, and Reconciliations in the Senate’s Guarded Apology 
for Slavery, 42 CONN. L. REV. CONTEMPLATIONS 1, 1 (2009) (discussing the lackluster 
approach the United States has to public apologies). 
 54. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 121; see also Wenger, supra note 53 
(noting criticism about the Senate’s apology some 144 years after the end of the Civil 
War and 41 years after the end of Jim Crow and its inclusion of a conspicuous 
disclaimer clearly foreclosing a right to reparations for slavery). 
 55. Danny Lewis, Five Times the United States Officially Apologized, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 27, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-
news/five-times-united-states-officially-apologized-180959254/ [https://perma.cc/C5
H9-G94W]. In January 1893, a group of American sugar magnates staged a 
government-endorsed coup, forcing Hawaiian Queen Lili’uokalani to abdicate and 
dissolve the Kingdom of Hawaii. Id. The dissolution was the precursor to Hawaii’s 
formal annexation by the United States government. Id. One hundred years later on 
November 23, 1993, Congress issued a joint resolution formally apologizing to the 
people of Hawaii. Id. 
 56. Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding School: “The Last Acceptable Racism” and 
the United States’ Genocide of Native Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 165–66 (2013) 
(discussing the Senate’s apology to Native Americans that was buried in a 2010 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act); see also Rob Capriccioso, A Sorry Saga: 
Obama Signs Native American Apology Resolution; Fails to Draw Attention to It, 
INDIAN L. RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 13, 2010), http://indianlaw.org/node/529 [https://per
ma.cc/FS2V-EUUS] (reporting on an apology given by President Obama to Native 
Americans in the United States that was not highlighted by the administration). 
 57.  See Wesley Yiin, Timeline: It Took Over 100 Years for the African American 




 58. Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, Just Change”: Narrative 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an Inclusive Model for Social Healing, and the Truth 
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reparations to Blacks for 250 years of slavery and 90 years of Jim 
Crow segregation and to Native Americans for the depletion of 96% 
of their population,59 (4) two federal prosecutions, delayed 
investigations,60 and symbolic legislative efforts in response to the 
murders of Black Americans after the Brown decisions,61 and (5) a 
truth-telling initiative redressing wrongdoing against Black male 
participants in the longest nontherapeutic experiment on human 
beings in medical history,62 but a tacit rejection of pleas from 
 
About the Torture Commission, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25–29 (2011) [hereinafter 
We Don’t Want Dollars] (briefly summarizing the quest for reparations in the United 
States). In 1988, Congress authorized a $20,000 reparation payment for the 
survivors of the federal government’s forced internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II. Id. See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, 
ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 54 (making the argument that the United States 
government should give reparations to African American people). 
 59. MAINE WABANAKI-STATE CHILD WELFARE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION 
COMM’N, BEYOND THE MANDATE: CONTINUING THE CONVERSATION 63 (2015), 
http://www.mainewabanakitrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/TRC-Report-Expan
ded_July2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9M-METM]. 
 60. See Labuda, supra note 40, at 7–13 (discussing state and federal prosecutions 
beginning in the early 1990s and extending into the early 2000s for Jim Crow Era 
murders). The most well-known of these federally-endorsed reconciliatory initiatives 
are the criminal investigations and prosecutions for the murders of Black Americans 
resulting from the massive resistance to the Brown decisions that began in the late 
1980s, well after the deaths of some culpable parties. Id.; S. Willoughby Anderson, 
The Past on Trial: Birmingham, the Bombing, and Restorative Justice, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 471, 471 (2008) (“Since 1989, state and national law enforcement authorities 
have reopened or begun investigations into at least eighteen civil rights-era murders 
across the South.”). 
 61. Maureen Johnson, Separate but (Un)Equal: Why Institutionalized Anti-
Racism Is the Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 327, 361–62 (2018); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EMMETT TILL UNSOLVED 
CIVIL RIGHTS CRIME ACT OF 2007 AND FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
PURSUANT TO THE EMMETT TILL UNSOLVED CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES REAUTHORIZATION 
ACT OF 2016 22–25 (2018) (enumerating an extensive list of Black Americans who 
were victims of racialized violence); Barbara A. Schwabauer, The Emmett Till 
Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act: The Cold Case of Racism in the Criminal Justice 
System, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 656 (2010) (explaining the history and impact of the 
Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act); Ronald Turner, Plessy 2.0, 13 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 861, 889 (2009) (discussing what he describes as the “murder[s], 
bombings, beatings, and castrations of those fighting for and seeking relief from the 
entrenched and enervating system of racial caste and hierarchy”). 
 62. Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Comm., Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study in Macon County, Alabama—1932–1972, U. VA.: HIST. COLLECTIONS CLAUDE 
MOORE HEALTH SCI. LIBR. (May 1996), http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/badblood 
[https://perma.cc/83TM-3TPC]. The forty-year study known as the Tuskegee Study 
of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male withheld treatment for a lethal, highly-
contagious disease from hundreds of Black men in the rural South. Id.; see also 
Ensign, supra note 13, at 8–20 (discussing the final report of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel commissioned in 1973 by the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). 
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legislators,63 scholars, and community-based advocacy groups to 
launch more comprehensive federally-funded reconciliatory 
initiatives.64 Furthermore, no federally-endorsed reconciliatory 
initiatives have comprehensively examined the intergenerational 
trauma caused by decades of segregation as an educational policy, 
integration’s failure to debunk stereotypes of Black intellectual 
inferiority, or the modern-day consequences of these reconciliatory 
failures.65 
In the absence of federally-endorsed reconciliatory initiatives, 
educational institutions, corporations, states, and non-profit 
organizations have launched more comprehensive reconciliatory 
 
 63.  See Donna Owens, Veteran Congressman Still Pushing for Reparations in a 
Divided America, NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2017, 2:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews
.com/news/nbcblk/rep-john-conyers-still-pushing-reparations-divided-america-
n723151 [https://perma.cc/94F8-SDZC]. Every year since 1989 until his resignation 
in 2017, Congressman John Conyers of Michigan proposed legislation  
to acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and 
inhumanity of slavery in the United States and the 13 American colonies 
between 1619 and 1865 and to establish a commission to examine the 
institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic 
discrimination against African Americans, and the impact of these forces on 
living African Americans, to make recommendations to the Congress on 
appropriate remedies, and for other purposes. 
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 201 (2001) (quoting 
Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 103d 
Cong. (1993)). After Congressman Conyers’s retirement, Congressman Sheila 
Jackson Lee sponsored the bill. See Commission to Study and Develop Reparation 
Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 116th Cong. (2019). On June 19, 2019, 
Congress recognized Congressman Conyers and Lee’s legislative efforts and held a 
hearing on the subject of reparations for the descendants of slaves in the United 
States. See P.R. Lockhart, America Is Having an Unprecedented Debate About 
Reparations. What Comes Next?, VOX (June 20, 2019, 3:30 PM) https://www.
vox.com/identities/2019/6/20/18692949/congress-reparations-slavery discrimination-
hr-40-coates-glover [https://perma.cc/Z8NL-WUK4] [hereinafter Debate About 
Reparations]. 
 64. See, e.g., Ensign, supra note 13, at 3 (“[T]he United States has never 
established a formal truth and reconciliation commission, despite its entrenched 
history of human rights abuses against Black Americans.”); Parker, supra note 15, 
at 35–42 (advocating for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission 
to address state-sanctioned wrongdoing against the Alaskan Native population); 
Erika Wilson, The Great American Dilemma: Law and the Intransigence of Racism, 
20 CUNY L. REV. 513, 519 (2017) (discussing the community-based transitional 
justice inspired initiatives in Greensboro, North Carolina but noting the absence of 
“a country-wide comprehensive attempt at Truth and Reconciliation around 
America’s history of slavery and discrimination”); Margaret M. Russell, Reopening 
the Emmett Till Case: Lessons and Challenges for Critical Race Practice, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2101, 2113 (2005) (discussing unhealed wounds in American 
society in conjunction with efforts to launch a truth and reconciliation commission 
for lynching). 
 65. See CASHIN, supra note 4, at IX–XXII (discussing the failure of integration in 
the United States and its effects). 
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agendas that include apologies, the removal of confederate imagery, 
and truth-telling initiatives. Georgetown University,66 Brown 
University, the Southern Baptist Seminary,67 and private sector 
businesses, such as Wachovia, Aetna, Lehman Brothers, and J.P. 
Morgan, have apologized for perpetuating and financially 
benefitting from slavery.68 Furthermore, beginning in the 1990s 
and continuing into the early 2000s, several Southern states 
apologized for slavery69 and removed confederate imagery from 
official government buildings, property, and schools.70 Other 
Southern states and cities endorsed truth-telling initiatives 
acknowledging the intergenerational trauma caused by racially-
motivated massacres of the early Jim Crow era. Notable examples 
include the Tulsa Race Riots Commission,71 Florida’s Historical 
Commission for the Rosewood Massacre,72 and the Wilmington Race 
 
 66. See Alexa Lardieri, Georgetown Students Vote for Reparations for Slave 
Descendants, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.
usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2019-04-12/georgetown-students-vote-
for-reparations-for-descendants-of-slaves [https://perma.cc/V42R-VWNG]. 
 67. See Tom Gjelten, Southern Baptist Seminary Confronts History of 
Slaveholding and ‘Deep Racism’, NPR (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:02 AM), http://www.npr.or
g/2018/12/13/676333342/southern-baptist-seminary-confronts-history-of-slaveholdi
ng-and-deep-racism [https://perma.cc/5SG4-TR3H]. 
 68. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 121–22 (identifying a list of major United 
States corporations that have apologized for the financial benefits incurred from 
slavery); Should the US Pay Reparations to Black Americans?, PBS: POINT TAKEN 
(May 10, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/video/point-taken-should-us-pay-reparations-
black-americans/#intro [https://perma.cc/5CDS-X53L]. 
 69. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 120–21 n.42 (outlining legislative 
efforts in Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, and Virginia). 
 70. See generally James Shockley, Farewell to Dixie: California’s Attempt to 
Eliminate the Confederacy from Public Schools, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 127 (2016) 
(examining California’s attempt to pass a law eliminating Confederate names from 
being used to name public schools); Allison M. Mosig, Hate or Civic Pride? The Speech 
of Symbols in the United States, Germany and Japan, 40 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 73 (2017) (discussing the question of how to deal with the Confederate Flag in 
the United States through the lenses of Japanese and German policy concerning 
Nazi symbols and the Rising Sun Flag). 
 71. Tulsa Race Massacre, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/roaring-twentie
s/tulsa-race-massacre [https://perma.cc/228A-LLJY]. The Tulsa Race Riots 
Commission was established in 2000 by the State of Oklahoma to acknowledge what 
has been described as one of the most violent racial clashes in American history. Id. 
The Commission’s report found that approximately 100 to 300 people lost their lives 
during the riot and that more than 8,000 people were made homeless. Id. This 
eighteen-hour-long massacre against the Greenwood community, home to a 
prosperous business district known as the Black Wall Street, was precipitated by a 
false newspaper report that Black World War I veterans were planning a massive 
armed revolt to prevent the lynching of a Black man falsely accused of sexually 
assaulting a White woman. Id. 
 72. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 
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Riot Commission.73 Several grassroots community organizations 
have also launched truth-telling initiatives redressing modern-day 
social justice issues that stem from the repression of Jim Crow 
segregation. The Mississippi Truth Telling Commission, 
established in 2008, is the most ambitious of these grassroots 
efforts, declaring its intent to become the first state-wide truth 
commission in United States history to comprehensively examine 
segregation in Mississippi and its modern-day consequences.74 
Other notable examples include the Greensboro Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, the first grassroots community-based 
TRC, established in 2004 to investigate the 1979 murder of five 
Black demonstrators by Klansmen and members of the American 
Nazi Party,75 the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission 
established in 2009 to provide legal redress for victims tortured by 
the Chicago Police Department,76 and the Metro Detroit Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission established in 2011 to examine the 
impact of institutional racism in Metropolitan Detroit.77 
However, only a few transitional justice inspired initiatives 
have acknowledged the intergenerational psychological trauma 
caused by Jim Crow segregation or by violent resistance to school 
 
820–22 (2006) (discussing the Florida legislative mandate that led to a Commission 
investigating the Rosewood massacre). Rosewood was the only state-endorsed truth-
telling initiative that resulted in an apology and an award of reparations of $2.1 
million to be divided among the Rosewood survivors and their descendants. Id.; C. 
Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their 
Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 503, 503 (1994). 
 73. See 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT 
REPORT (2006), https://digital.ncdcr.gov/digital/collection/p249901coll22/id/5842 [htt
ps://perma.cc/3HVA-BLUY]. In 2000, the North Carolina General Assembly 
established the commission. Id. at 11. The culmination of the commission’s work was 
a 500-page report that was published on May 31, 2006. Id. at 1. 
 74. See Labuda, supra note 40, at 19–23 (discussing comprehensively the 
commission’s goals and mandates); Mississippi Truth Project, VIMEO, 
https://vimeo.com/mstruthproject [https://perma.cc/LA5L-WDLA]. 
 75. See Ensign, supra note 13, at 20–37 (discussing comprehensively the origins 
and impact of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission); Parker, supra 
note 15, at 58–60. 
 76. See Vickie Casanova Willis & Standish E. Willis, Black People Against Police 
Torture: The Importance of Building a People-Centered Human Rights Movement, 21 
PUB. INT. L. REP. 235, 247–48 (2015) (discussing comprehensively the Illinois Torture 
Inquiry and Relief Commission’s origins and impact); Kim D. Chanbonpin, Truth 
Stories: Credibility Determinations at the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief 
Commission, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, 1088–91 (2014) (same). 
 77. See Parker, supra note 15, at 60 (discussing the commission’s formation and 
organizational struggles); The Metropolitan Detroit Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/metrodetroittruth [https://perma.
cc/5QAP-N8E9]. 
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desegregation. Scholars have begun studying the impact of 
intergenerational trauma, finding evidence “that repressing 
feelings associated with acts of [W]hite racism may be 
psychologically damaging and lay the foundation for future mental 
health problems and behaviors symptomatic of post-traumatic 
stress syndrome.”78 Dr. Joy DeGruy, a noted scholar on the 
intergenerational psychological effects of slavery and segregation, 
notes that “[r]ecent research in the field of epigenetics has revealed 
that trauma can actually impact an individual’s DNA, and the 
manifestations of the traumas experienced by prior generations can 
be passed along genetically to future offspring.”79 Inspired by 
empirical evidence about the impact of intergenerational trauma, 
grassroots community organizations, universities, and museums 
have launched healing initiatives to create public awareness about 
its impact in the Black community. To redress the intergenerational 
psychological trauma of de jure segregation, community-based 
organizations in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Bridgeport and New 
Haven, Connecticut offer community healing workshops that 
encourage participants to use music, prayer, and poetry as conduits 
for emotional healing.80 Universities have endorsed cross-racial 
healing initiatives that foster candid and constructive 
conversations about race and the unfortunate legacy of Jim Crow 
era segregation.81 The most notable of these university-sponsored 
reconciliatory initiatives is the William Winter Institute for Racial 
Reconciliation, which started at the University of Mississippi.82 The 
Welcome Table is the Winter Institute’s flagship healing initiative; 
 
 78. Alma Carten, How the Legacy of Slavery Affects the Mental Health of Black 
Americans Today, CONVERSATION (July 27, 2015), https://theconversation.com/how-
the-legacy-of-slavery-affects-the-mental-health-of-black-americans-today-44642 
[https://perma.cc/D8U4-TTVC]; see also JOY DEGRUY, POST TRAUMATIC SLAVE 
SYNDROME: AMERICA’S LEGACY OF ENDURING INJURY AND HEALING 13–15, 100–05 
(2005) (describing the author’s theory of post traumatic slave syndrome and 
associated patterns of behavior). 
 79. See Adilifu Fundi, 6: “Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome”—Jay-Z and Kanye 
“Behavior” Fully Explained, RENAISSANCE MAN (May 15, 2019), https://renaissance
manjam.wordpress.com/ [https://perma.cc/L2D9-DPPV] (quoting Joy DeGruy); see 
also DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 124. 
 80. See Enola G. Aird, Toward a Renaissance for the African-American Family: 
Confronting the Lie of Black Inferiority, 58 EMORY L.J. 7, 18 (2008); Vision and 
Mission, CMTY. HEALING NETWORK, https://www.communityhealingnet.org/vision-
mission/ [https://perma.cc/C4VH-WTZH]. 
 81. See, e.g., Office of Diversity and Inclusion: South Carolina Collaborative for 
Race and Reconciliation, U.S.C., http://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/diversity_
and_inclusion/race_reconciliation/index.php [https://perma.cc/8GHC-ATTG]. 
 82. See About the William Winter Institute, WINTER INST., https://www.winterin
stitute.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/69PB-WJJU]. 
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it consists of a series of interactive conversations that equip people 
from diverse racial and cultural backgrounds with the capacity to 
have difficult conversations about race.83 The Welcome Table has 
become a model for other universities and non-profit community 
organizations interested in launching community healing 
initiatives. In 2017, the University of South Carolina launched 
Welcome Table SC, a series of cross-racial conversations modeled 
on the Welcome Table program.84 Welcome Table dialogues also 
inspired the creation of the Emmett Till Interpretive Center which 
is housed in the courthouse where the infamous trial of Till’s 
murderers occurred.85 
Similar transitional justice inspired initiatives 
commemorating forgotten aspects of Jim Crow segregation through 
the innovative use of storytelling, interactive media, and visual arts 
have become popular in several Southern states. In 2018, Equal 
Justice Initiative launched the National Memorial for Peace and 
Justice in Montgomery, Alabama, the first national memorial 
honoring the thousands of Black men, women, and children who 
“were hanged, burned alive, shot, drowned, and beaten to death by 
[W]hite mobs between 1877 and 1950.”86 The museum’s political 
message is communicated through an interactive, visual design 
that forces visitors to empathize with victims and thus gain an 
unparalleled understanding of the heinousness of the racial 
terrorism endemic to Jim Crow segregation.87 Museum visitors are 
confronted with 800 6-foot-tall suspended steel blocks.88 Each block 
represents a county where racial killings occurred, and “[a]s you 
walk through the memorial, the orientation of the hanging 
monuments changes from eye level to overhead, evoking the way 
many lynching victims were hanged, often in public spaces.”89 Jars 
 
 83. The Welcome Table, WINTER INST., http://winterinstitute.org/community-
building/the-welcome-table [https://perma.cc/ENA7-M553]. 
 84. See Office of Diversity and Inclusion: Welcome Table SC, U.S.C., 
https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/diversity_and_inclusion/race_reconciliatio
n/welcome_table_sc/index.php [https://perma.cc/QWG9-YXUN]. 
 85. Video of Our Story, EMMETT TILL INTERPRETIVE CTR., http://www.emmett-
till.org/ [https://perma.cc/T24Z-4EZ6]. 
 86. Museum and Memorial Homepage, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
http://museumandmemorial.eji.org/ [https://perma.cc/36CY-N472]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Debbie Elliott, New Lynching Memorial Is a Space ‘To Talk About All of That 
Anguish’, NPR (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/04/26/604271871/
new-lynching-memorial-is-a-space-to-talk-about-all-of-that-anguish [https://perma.c
c/YS8E-Y7QZ].  
 89. Id. 
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of soil gathered from documented lynching sites and other sites of 
racially-motivated murders commemorate the victims.90 Another 
distinctive feature of the memorial’s counterpart, the Legacy 
Museum, is the way that its organizers encourage racial 
reconciliation in a manner that connects the past to the present.91 
Officials from counties where the lynchings occurred are 
encouraged to take replicas of the steel blocks back to their 
communities and create local memorials that invite community 
dialogue.92 
Other reconciliatory initiatives have explored the 
intergenerational psychosocial trauma caused by violent resistance 
to school desegregation. In 2011, the Union of Minority 
Neighborhoods, a Boston grassroots community organization, 
launched the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project (BBDP), a city-
wide effort to redress one of the nation’s most overt, violent 
responses to the Brown cases’ mandate to desegregate.93 The BBDP 
began its innovative work in 2011 with the screening of its film, Can 
We Talk?—Learning from Boston’s Busing/Desegregation Crisis.94 
A crucial mandate of its organizers is to honor the experiences of 
those who lived through the crisis by addressing a pivotal moment 
in Boston’s history, one that continues to negatively impact the 
educational success of Boston students.95 The BBDP implements its 
mandate through screenings of the film, presentations, oral 
histories, and detailed reports that facilitate empowerment and 
community action through access to a more nuanced portrait of this 
pivotal era that goes beyond “simplified sound bites . . . that the 
crisis was a failed social experiment or the cause of [W]hite flight or 
middle class flight from public schools.”96 Another equally 
 
 90. Erica Wright, Citizen-Led Coalition Uncovers History of Lynching in Jeffco, 
BIRMINGHAM TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.birminghamtimes.com/2019/03/citi
zen-led-coalition-uncovers-history-of-lynching-in-jeffco/ [https://perma.cc/WSS9-X5L
V]. 
 91. Elliott, supra note 88 (noting the “direct line from slavery to lynching and to 
issues the country faces today, including mass incarceration”). 
 92. Wright, supra note 90; Elliott, supra note 88. 
 93. About the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project, NE. UNIV., http://bpsdesegr
egation.library.northeastern.edu/about-the-boston-busing-desegregation-project/ 
[https://perma.cc/RDE8-V9R8]. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See THE BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: 
7 QUESTIONS 7 LESSONS 1–2 (2014), https://bpsdesegregation.library.northeastern.e
du/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/7-lessons-bbdp-9-11-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8D2-
KCUF]. 
 96. Id. at 2 (emphasis removed); About the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project, 
supra note 93. 
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important goal is what its organizers describe as exploring and 
acknowledging the intergenerational trauma surrounding the crisis 
and repudiating a national memory of the crisis that “minimizes 
and excludes the stories of many communities . . . in order to gain a 
systemic understanding of the era for the diversity of people, then 
and now, whose interests converge around wanting equity, access, 
and excellence for all.”97 
These domestic transitional justice inspired initiatives 
launched by the diverse group of public and private stakeholders 
have acknowledged the intergenerational impact of Jim Crow 
segregation and created awareness about the various ways in which 
federal, state, and local governments were complicit in endorsing 
normalized collective wrongdoing and human rights violations 
rooted in White supremacy. However, even these more 
comprehensive transitional justice inspired initiatives cannot 
compensate for the absence of comprehensive federally-endorsed 
reconciliatory initiatives for many of the reasons outlined by 
transitional justice scholars, such as inadequate financial resources 
and a disengaged public, that denies the absence of a larger political 
and communal context for government-sanctioned human rights 
abuses.98 And consequently, reconciliation remains an elusive 









 97. THE BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, REPORT ON PHASE ONE 5 
(2012), http://bpsdesegregation.library.northeastern.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/0
1/BBDP-Year-One-Report-10.5.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UEH-2WNB] [hereinafter
 BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT]. 
 98. See Parker, supra note 15, at 32–33 (discussing generally the limitations of 
truth and reconciliation commissions); Labuda, supra note 40, at 32 (criticizing the 
absence of communal responsibility as a limitation of truth and reconciliation 
commissions and other prevalent transitional justice practices); Melia Thompson-
Dudiak, Comparison: Improving How the Legacies of State-Sponsored Segregation in 
the United States and South Africa Affect Equity and Inclusion in American and 
South African Higher Education Systems, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 163, 201 (2018) 
(discussing social attitudes towards redressing issues of racial equity in higher 
education and the general lack of historical consciousness among the public about 
the context of continued racial inequities in higher education). 
 
20 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 2 
II. Lost in Transition: The Court’s Transitional 
Jurisprudence Replicates the Relational Inequities of 
Jim Crow by Perpetuating Attitudes of Black 
Intellectual Inferiority 
 
[A] desegregated society that is not integrated . . . leads to 
physical proximity without spiritual affinity [and] gives us a 
society where men are physically desegregated and spiritually 
segregated, where elbows are together and hearts are apart.99 
—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
In the absence of comprehensive federally-endorsed 
reconciliatory initiatives, the diverse group of previously referenced 
public and private sector stakeholders aspire to transform the 
United States from a society that remains fractured by a largely 
unacknowledged history of government-sanctioned human rights 
violations into one where elbows and hearts are together and where 
racial hierarchies are eradicated. But this observation about the 
saliency of comprehensive federally-endorsed reconciliatory 
initiatives assumes that transitional justice principles apply to 
established democracies, such as the United States. The 
proliferation of transitional justice inspired initiatives in 
established democracies troubles some scholars who fear that the 
moniker will become a generic label for any kind of political 
transition.100 However, the shift from Jim Crow segregation—a 
sociopolitical regime that nullified the mandates of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their promise of full 
legal inclusion for Black Americans101—was no mundane political 
transition, but a radical, paradigmatic one triggering transitional 
justice. Because of segregation’s legacy of physical and 
 
 99. Ericka Aiken, Murder at Freedom’s Gate: Poverty, Race, & Education in 
America, 5 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 31, 38 (2013) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Nashville 
Consultation: An Analysis of the Ethical Demands of Integration (Dec. 27, 1962)). 
 100. See, e.g., Davis & Scharrer, supra note 12, at 108–09, n.69 (noting the 
traditional definition of transitional justice and considering whether its principles 
apply to societies not experiencing a political transition but that are still fractured 
by long-standing and pervasive human rights violations); Yamamoto et al., supra 
note 14, at 120–27 (surveying domestic and international reconciliatory efforts and 
transitional justice initiatives); Quinn, supra note 14, at 63–66, 75–78 (noting the 
traditional conception of transitional justice and the expansion of transitional justice 
principles by various scholars challenging the assumption that its principles are 
inapplicable to settled democracies). 
 101. Turner, supra note 61, at 867–70; Jim Crow Laws, HIST., http://www.histor
y.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-crow-laws  [https://perma.cc/KTN6-K638]. 
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psychological atrocities against Black Americans,102 social justice 
advocates have argued that the struggle for civil rights in the 
United States is comparable to the struggle for international 
human rights.103 Malcolm X succinctly summarized the synergy 
between the two movements, noting that civil rights is “[n]ot just an 
American problem, but a World problem.”104 Seizing upon yet 
another connection between civil and human rights, Josie 
Foehrenbach Brown alluded to deficiencies in the transition from 
segregation, observing that “[f]rom the announcement of the Brown 
opinion, we have failed as a nation to attend to the complicated 
details of transitional justice.”105 This historical, political, and social 
context informs the argument advanced in this section that the 
broad remedial scope of transitional justice applies to the 
desegregation of American schools. The first sub-section establishes 
that the criteria identified by noted transitional justice scholars 
applies to the desegregation of American schools. And the last sub-
section critiques the Brown cases and key cases in the Court’s 
desegregation jurisprudence through the lens of transitional justice 
and then explores some of the modern-day consequences of their 
transitional deficiencies. 
A. Brown I as a Transitional Rule of Law 
Brown I was the beginning of a transitional period in 
American  society and in its system of public education. The Court 
explicitly recognized the ways in which Jim Crow segregation 
negatively impacted the educational experiences of Black 
students106 and implicitly acknowledged how it divested Black 
parents of the agency to make educational decisions for their 
children, human rights107 that are freely available in truly 
 
 102. See discussion infra Sections II.A–B. 
 103. Casanova Willis & Willis, supra note 76, at 241 (discussing the 1951 
publication of We Charge Genocide, the groundbreaking document by W.E.B. DuBois 
and filed on behalf of the Civil Rights Congress equating the war crimes of Nazi 
Germany to the evils of Jim Crow segregation in the United States). 
 104. Id. at 240. 
 105. Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 137. 
 106. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[I]n the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
 107. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Educating American Youth: Lessons from 
Children’s Human Rights Law, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 173, 187–90 (1998) (citing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and discussing educational rights in human 
rights law and the broad recognition of not only a right to education but one free from 
discrimination and an education that is directed to “the full development of the 
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democratic societies. The Court’s recognition of the ways in which 
segregation stripped Black students of essential educational rights 
signaled the beginning of the nation’s transition from the repressive 
sociopolitical regime of de jure segregated education to a more 
egalitarian political and educational system.108 And so, in 1954, the 
United States was a transitional society adapting to a new 
sociopolitical order no longer premised on White supremacy. 
Murphy has articulated a comprehensive analysis of the 
sociopolitical conditions that trigger transitional justice.109 Her 
analysis rejects superficial political distinctions and instead 
examines how purportedly democratic societies actually function.110 
According to Murphy, transitional societies function in ways that 
are profoundly different from truly democratic ones because they 
exhibit the following four characteristics: pervasive structural 
inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious 
existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about 
authority.111 The following analysis supports the argument that 
Brown I was a transitional rule of law, and thus substantiates the 
applicability of transitional justice’s broad remedial framework to 
the desegregation of American schools. 
1. Exposing Pervasive Structural Inequalities and the 
Normalized Collective Wrongdoing of Segregation 
Brown I revealed the pervasive structural inequalities of Jim 
Crow school segregation and implicitly repudiated the normalized 
collective and political wrongdoing inherent in segregation.112 
Segregation is the paradigmatic example of pervasive structural 
inequality. In transitional societies, pervasive structural 
 
human personality” (quoting International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.A. 3 Art 13)). 
 108. See MILDRED WIGFALL ROBINSON & RICHARD J. BONNIE, Introduction to LAW 
TOUCHED OUR HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
4 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) (noting that the Court’s 
denunciation of segregation as an educational policy in Brown I led to the ultimate 
rejection of “legally enforced segregation in every area of life” in conjunction with the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 109. See MURPHY, supra note 12, at 38–82 (describing exhaustively the four 
circumstances of transitional justice). 
 110. See id. at 76–78 (discussing the need for a comprehensive assessment based 
on the four circumstances of transitional justice before determining whether 
transitional justice principles apply to established democracies such as the United 
States). 
 111. Id. at 41. 
 112. See WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108. 
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inequalities are reflected in the ways that institutions create and 
endorse practices that deprive their citizens of agency and 
reciprocity that, in turn, result in inequitable treatment.113 The 
severity of these opportunity-stripping practices seriously 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of societal institutions, creating “a moral 
imperative to enact structural changes or reform.”114 Lastly, 
structural inequalities become pervasive when they cast doubt on 
the legitimacy of societal institutions, creating a “reason to adopt 
certain kind[s] of measures to overthrow that order.”115 Murphy 
acknowledges that segregation is a classic example of pervasive 
structural inequality.116 As an illustration, she uses the example of 
apartheid in South Africa,117 a political regime based on racial 
segregation that was virtually identical to Jim Crow segregation118 
in the United States.119 One civil rights scholar eloquently captures 
the extent of the pervasive structural inequalities of Jim Crow 
segregation, comparing them to apartheid: 
 
Jim Crow was more than the practice of racial segregation; it 
was an applied ideology of [W]hite supremacy that did not just 
keep African Americans in a fixed subordinate position in 
society, it tried to push them further down, if not to eliminate 
them altogether. Braced by violence, discrimination was built 
 
 113. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44–45. 
 114. Id. at 49. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 46. 
 117. Id. at 47–48. 
 118. In the Southern states, Jim Crow laws, the term given to a collection of state 
and local statutes that legalized segregation, subordinated Black Americans by 
nullifying the mandates of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
and their promise of full legal inclusion in United States’ democratic society and 
returning the political and economic structure of the Southern states to an 
antebellum class structure that resembled slavery. Turner, supra note 61, at 867–
70; see also Jim Crow Laws, supra note 101. Although the Northern states did not 
inherit a political, social, and economic structure that was as rigidly segregated as 
those in the South, they shared many of the same beliefs about the moral and 
intellectual inferiority of Black Americans. See id. In Roberts v. City of Boston, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts permitted segregation under the state’s 
constitution. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849); In Pursuit of Equality, 
SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST., http://americanhistory.si.
edu/brown/history/2-battleground/pursuit-equality-1.html [https://perma.cc/MQ9V-
H9PW]. 
 119. Zachary Norris, Repairing Harm from Racial Injustice: An Analysis of the 
Justice Reinvestment Initiative and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 94 
DENV. L. REV. 515, 517 (2017). See generally Benjamin Zinkel, Apartheid and Jim 
Crow: Drawing Lessons from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation, J. DISP. 
RESOL. 229 (2019) (exhaustively comparing apartheid and Jim Crow segregation). 
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into the legal, political, cultural, economic, social, and 
educational scaffolding that reinforced [W]hite power and 
denied African Americans the means to improve their lives, 
hence the term American apartheid.120 
 
Just as apartheid was a political, legal, and economic system 
of exploitation that divested Black South Africans of agency and 
reciprocity,121 Jim Crow segregation created differential 
opportunities and limited prospects for Black Americans in access 
to courts, employment, housing, and voting.122 But nowhere were 
the pervasive structural inequalities of segregation more evident 
than in public education. 
Because of their ability to shape civic identity, schools are 
classic examples of the kinds of norm-setting institutions where 
victims of government sanctioned wrongdoing may lack agency and 
reciprocity.123 Southern culture “was erected on the presumption of 
[B]lack inability,” observed one scholar, and “Black prosperity and 
success—indeed, [B]lack intelligence—were unimaginable and, 
thus, justified the disparate funding in education that had led to 
abysmal schools . . . .”124 Dr. Kenneth Clark, the renowned 
psychologist hired by the NAACP legal defense team in preparation 
for its attack on segregation, observed that in Clarendon County, 
South Carolina, Black students learned in segregated school 
environments of extreme deprivation with no running water, no 
urinals, and no sinks for students, and that their classrooms had no 
blackboards, maps, globes, auditoriums, or music rooms—facilities 
that White students enjoyed.125 Although Blacks comprised 70% of 
Clarendon County’s population and approximately 6,000 out of the 
county’s 8,000 school-aged children, the county spent $100,000 
more on the education of its White students.126 In Delaware, state 
 
 120. ANNE VALK & LESLIE BROWN, LIVING WITH JIM CROW: AFRICAN AMERICAN 
WOMEN AND MEMORIES OF THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 9 (2010); see also Neil G. 
Williams, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: What Makes for Greatness 
in a Legal Opinion?, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178 (2004) (referring to Jim Crow 
segregation as American apartheid). 
 121. Norris, supra note 119, at 517; Zinkel, supra note 119, at 233–35. 
 122. VALK & BROWN, supra note 120, at 12–13. 
 123. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44. 
 124. CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL 
DIVIDE 54 (2016). 
 125. PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN 
DECISION 67 (Penguin Books 2004) (2002). 
 126. John W. White, Managed Compliance: White Resistance and Desegregation 
in South Carolina, 1950–1970, at 27 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Florida) (on file at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0013899/white_j.pdf 
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officials “abdicated all responsibility for the education of its African 
American citizens” and even thwarted efforts by the Black 
community to generate private, philanthropic resources earmarked 
for education.127 Furthermore, at the time of the Court’s decision in 
Brown I, the entire state of Delaware had only one high school for 
its Black students.128 Similarly, in Prince Edward County, Virginia, 
no high school for Black students existed until 1939, although 45% 
of the county’s population was composed of African Americans, and 
by 1947, the only high school serving Black students was severely 
overcrowded.129 The collective impact of these educational 
inequities on the life prospects for Black students struggling for a 
genuine opportunity for an education was devastating, and 
according to one scholar: 
 
The result of such widespread disparities in funding was that 
the U.S. educational system, despite the demands of parents 
and students craving high-quality schools, had deliberately 
produced a sprawling, uneducated population.  In Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi, with a 
combined population of 4.7 million African Americans, more 
than half of all [B]lack adults by the mid-1940s had less than 
five years of formal education.130 
 
As the disparities of Jim Crow segregation dominated every 
aspect of Black life, Black Americans and their allies felt morally 
compelled to overthrow it. Dr. King’s justification of civil 
disobedience during the civil rights movement demonstrates the 
moral imperative of overthrowing segregation: “An individual who 
breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly 
accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the 
conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality 
expressing the highest respect for the law.”131 King’s justification 
for civil disobedience is echoed by civil rights scholars who 
frequently use the language of revolution when discussing the 
urgency for sociopolitical change heralded by Brown I. One scholar 
 
[https://perma.cc/XS73-4QCZ]). 
 127. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 68. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 68–69. 
 130. Id. at 70–71. 
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describes the decision as creating “a chain reaction in society 
equivalent to that of nuclear fission.”132 Another described Brown I 
as the “day of reckoning” for segregation and noted the optimism 
that Brown I generated among some in the Black community: “At 
that moment, it appeared that citizenship—true citizenship—might 
finally be at hand for African Americans.”133 When Brown I was 
decided, the United States was a transitional society where Black 
Americans experienced pervasive structural inequality that limited 
their agency and reciprocity in every aspect of their lives. 
As “the day of reckoning” for segregation, Brown I also 
implicitly repudiated the normalized collective and political 
wrongdoing of Jim Crow segregation. Murphy defines normalized 
collective and political wrongdoing as “actions or omissions of 
particular human beings that result in violations of human 
rights”134 perpetrated by state actors against a targeted 
population.135 These human rights violations must be political, 
meaning that they further “political goals or policies . . . about how 
a given political society should be structured”136 and become so 
ubiquitous that they are normalized.137 Segregation was inherently 
political because it created a “hierarchy of humanity that placed 
Whiteness at the top and Blackness at the bottom.”138 The ubiquity 
of normalized collective and political wrongdoing during Jim Crow 
segregation—lynchings,139 massacres that destroyed autonomous 
 
 132. Williams, supra note 120, at 178 (quoting Norman C. Amaker, Life, History 
and the Constitution in the Struggle for Racial Equality, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 11 (A.L.I./A.B.A. Comm. on 
Continuing Prof’l Educ. ed., June 1988)). 
 133. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 74–75. But see Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 
998 (discussing the historical ambivalence and hostility to Brown I by some in the 
Black community); Paulette J. Delk, Training in Alabama, in LAW TOUCHED OUR 
HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 33, 33–34 
(Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) (observing that the 
decision went virtually unnoticed among Black educators in rural Baldwin County, 
Alabama because of fear of retaliatory terminations). 
 134. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 49–50. 
 135. Id. at 53. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 55. 
 138. Our Story, CMTY. HEALING NETWORK, http://www.communityhealingnet.org
/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/B7CZ-B76G]. 
 139. See Isabel Wilkerson, The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great Migration, 
Smithsonian Mag. (Sept. 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/long-last
ing-legacy-great-migration-180960118/ [https://perma.cc/9HQD-7XA4]. According to 
statistics from the Smithsonian, “[b]etween 1880 and 1950, an African-American was 
lynched more than once a week for some perceived breach of the racial hierarchy.” 
Id. Similarly, statistics indicate that “between 1877 and 1950, 4,075 ‘terror 
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Black communities,140 the convict lease system,141 and educational 
inequalities that left large segments of Black Americans poorly 
educated142—are well documented in the historical record. 
However, the issue of whether segregation violated the human 
rights of Black Americans is controversial.143 Much of the 
controversy stems from the United Nation’s (UN) failure to hold the 
United States accountable for its policies of state-sanctioned White 
supremacy that justified segregation.144 The UN was founded 
 
lynchings’ of African Americans occurred in the American South . . . .” Ursula Tracy 
Doyle, Strange Fruit at the United Nations, 61 HOW. L.J. 187, 207 (2018) (citing 
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF 
RACIAL TERROR 5 (3d ed. 2017); see also DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 96 (summarizing 
failed congressional and presidential efforts to end lynching). 
 140. 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, supra note 73, at 12. Perpetrated by 
Whites with the assistance of state and local law enforcement authorities, these 
massacres decimated autonomous, middle-class Black communities, destroying a 
collective memory of Black educational, economic, cultural, and political autonomy. 
See id. at 11–13, 256 (discussing the impact of the riot on the Black community, the 
profound lack of political power of the Black community after the riot, and the ways 
in which it negatively impacted all aspects of Black culture in that community); R. 
Thomas Dye, The Rosewood Massacre: History and the Making of Public Policy, 19 
PUB. HISTORIAN 25, 28 (1997) (discussing the Florida legislative mandate that led to 
a Commission investigating the massacre in Rosewood, Florida); Tulsa Race 
Massacre, supra note 71 (providing historical context for the eighteen-hour-long 
massacre against the Greenwood community, home to a prosperous business district 
known as the Black Wall Street). 
 141. DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 86–88. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, 
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE 
CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008) (comprehensively examining the practice of 
convict leasing and other forms of neo-slavery during Jim Crow segregation). Convict 
leasing was a system of neo-slavery that began in the aftermath of Reconstruction 
in which Black men, some of whom were falsely accused of criminal activity or 
charged with crimes as amorphous as vagrancy and changing employers without 
permission, were leased to businesses and farmers as a condition of their punishment 
but seldom paid for their work. See id. at 53–57; DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 66–88. 
Some historians estimate that “as many as a quarter of all black leased convicts 
throughout the South died while still under lease.” DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 87 
(citation omitted). And in Southern states of the former confederacy such as 
Alabama, “[c]onvict leasing was so successful that by 1898 nearly three quarters of 
Alabama’s total state revenue came directly from this institution.” Id. at 88. 
 142. See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing disparities in funding and 
infrastructure investment). 
 143. See generally Doyle, supra note 139 (examining extensively the United 
Nation’s failure to directly condemn Jim Crow segregation); Margaret R. Somers & 
Christopher N.J. Roberts, Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of “Buried 
Bodies” of Citizenship and Human Rights, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 385, 385 (2008) 
(discussing extensively the “struggles for inclusion and recognition surrounding 
human rights and citizenship—much of which has been hidden from history 
(especially African American human rights movements)”). 
 144. See Doyle, supra note 139, at 210. The United Nations was founded “in the 
wake of the Holocaust, a tragedy which spurred governments to vow that mass 
atrocities on this scale would never happen again[,]” with the goal of reaffirming 
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during the throes of Jim Crow segregation; but, although it 
vociferously condemned South African apartheid in the 1950s, it 
never denounced segregation in the United States.145 Instead, it 
generally referenced the evils of racial segregation and 
discrimination, unambiguously asserting that these practices 
violate human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).146 However, in 
the context of education, Article 26 of the UDHR describes the right 
to public education as a human right, recognizes that all children 
have a right to an education free of bias and discrimination,147 and 
provides that “[e]ducation shall be directed to the full development 
of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”148 Given the UN’s 
general denunciation of segregation and racially discriminatory 
educational practices and specific condemnation of apartheid, Jim 
Crow segregation violated the human rights of Black Americans. 
And so, when Brown I was decided, the United States was a 
transitional society characterized by normalized collective and 
political wrongdoing. 
2. Creating Serious Existential Uncertainty and 
Fundamental Uncertainties About Authority 
Brown I also created serious existential uncertainties about 
the stability of a sociopolitical order no longer rooted in White 
supremacy and about the authority of the federal judiciary. In 
Murphy’s analytical paradigm, serious existential uncertainty 
occurs when, in the face of “credible attempts to disrupt the status 
quo overhauling pervasive structural inequality,”149 officials are 
uncertain about whether the old political order will return or 
whether the new, more progressive one will succeed.150 Victims of 
normalized collective and political wrongdoing also experience a 
similar kind of existential uncertainty; they, too, are uncertain 
about whether the new political order will lead to the elimination of 
 
“faith in . . . the dignity and worth of the human person [and] in the equal rights of 
men and women.” Id. at 189, 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Charter 
pmbl.). 
 145. Id. at 209–10, 212–14. 
 146. See id. at 211–12 (discussing the requirements of resolution 103(I)). 
 147. See Levesque, supra note 107, at 187–90. 
 148. Id. at 190 (alteration in original) (quoting Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, (31) GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. 26(2)). 
 149. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 70. 
 150. Id. at 68. 
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structural inequalities or whether the violence and social inequities 
of the old political order will return.151 Due to the instability of the 
new sociopolitical order, individual decision-making becomes 
extremely difficult.152 The Court’s ruling in Brown I was 
immediately followed by massive resistance,153 creating existential 
uncertainties about the success of desegregation and the future of 
public education. The most infamous, sustained examples of 
resistance to school desegregation occurred in Virginia, dubbed by 
one scholar as the “birthplace of Massive Resistance.”154 Virginia 
Governor James Lindsay Almond closed schools in Charlottesville, 
Norfolk, and Front Royal in defiance of court orders to desegregate, 
proclaiming that: “We will oppose . . . with every facility at our 
command, and with every ounce of our energy, the attempt being 
made to mix the [W]hite and Negro races in our classrooms.”155 
Fearing the eminent desegregation of Virginia schools, local 
officials in Prince Edward County diverted tax dollars from the 
public schools into all-White Prince Edward Academy and offered 
White parents state-funded tuition grants.156 This pattern of 
funneling state money to private, segregated schools was replicated 
all over the state, and, as a result of the diversion of millions of tax 
dollars, nearly twenty percent of Virginia’s public schools closed.157 
The massive closing of public schools in Virginia cast the state into 
what one scholar described as an “educational apocalypse” with dire 
repercussions for Black students in Prince Edward County: 
 
 151. Id. at 66–67. 
 152. Id. at 68. 
 153. Turner, supra note 61, at 889. 
 154. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 81. 
 155.  Prince Edward Free Schools Association, HIST. ENGINE, 
http://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/4444 [https://perma.cc/YUN3-TP4
E]. Other Southern governors took a similar stance of defiance. See RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., SEGREGATION THEN, SEGREGATION SINCE: 
EDUCATION AND THE UNFINISHED MARCH 2 (2013), http://www.epi.org/publ
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Little Rock School Desegregation, STAN.: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES. & EDUC. 
INST., http://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/little-rock-school-desegregation 
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George Wallace vowed to defend segregation by defying the court’s edict in Brown I, 
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segregation forever.” Id. at 2. 
 156. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 68, 83. 
 157. Id. at 83. 
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While [W]hite children were educated, 2,700 [B]lack children 
were locked out. The defiance of Prince Edward County was 
singular—no other school system remained closed for five years 
(1959 to 1964) rather than comply with Brown. The 
impoverished but determined African American community 
managed to send some children away to relatives, but only 
thirty-five black students were able to attend those out-of-state 
schools on a full time basis.158 
 
The looming threat of violence caused by massive resistance to 
desegregation and school closures also demonstrates the difficulties 
of individual decision-making and the existential uncertainties 
faced by the parents of school-aged children. White parents were 
faced with a dilemma: acquiesce to the social pressures created by 
the resistance and remove their children from public schools or 
allow their children to attend desegregated schools, a choice that 
was most likely fraught with fear, given centuries-old stereotypes 
about the moral, social, and intellectual inferiority of Black 
students and realistic concerns about the potential for violence in 
newly integrated schools.159 Black parents faced a similar dilemma: 
acquiesce to the social pressures created by the resistance and forgo 
desegregated schools,160 object to desegregated schools on cultural 
or social grounds,161 or exercise the agency and reciprocity promised 
 
 158. Id. at 83–84. See generally CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, SOUTHERN STALEMATE: 
FIVE YEARS WITHOUT PUBLIC EDUCATION IN PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 2 
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_new.xsl&section=essay [https://perma.cc/PKR2-NSFZ] (discussing the promises 
and risks of school desegregation among Black and White Virginians). 
 160. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, What I Learned When Massive Resistance Closed My 
School, in LAW TOUCHED OUR HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION 135–38 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) 
(discussing the personal awakening that he experienced as a White student whose 
Norfolk, Virginia elementary school was closed amidst massive resistance to 
segregation by Governor J. Lindsay Almond); White, supra note 126, at 28–29 
(discussing the economic and physically violent reprisals faced by Blacks in 
Clarendon County, South Carolina after filing legal challenges to school 
segregation). 
 161. Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 993 n.13. 
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by Brown I and risk the physical and psychological violence of White 
parents and school officials.162 
Other Southern states enacted less dramatic measures that 
also created existential uncertainties about the success of school 
segregation. Under the guise of paternalism, North Carolina 
Governor Luther Hodges crafted a plan of “voluntary segregation” 
designed to exploit the fears in the Black community about the 
potential for massive deculturalization in Brown I’s aftermath.163 
“[I]f [B]lacks voluntarily remained in their own schools,” Hodges 
reasoned, then “they would receive superior facilities and also be 
able to better preserve their own culture and traditions than if they 
enrolled their children in school with [W]hites.”164 Playing into fears 
and uncertainties about the cultural risks of desegregation, Hodges 
warned that “if [B]lacks did not voluntarily go to segregated 
schools . . . then they would be responsible for school closures, 
robbing their children of educational opportunities in the 
process.”165 These subtle delay tactics coupled with the more overt 
ones of other Southern governors166 successfully stalled 
desegregation for a decade, as reflected by statistics indicating that 
in the decade after Brown I only an estimated 2% of Black children 
in the formerly de jure segregated Southern states attended school 
with White children.167 
The sociopolitical context in the aftermath of Brown I also 
manifested fundamental uncertainties about the Supreme Court’s 
authority to end segregation. Although similar to serious existential 
uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty about authority relates to 
who has standing to redress government sanctioned wrongdoing 
and pervasive structural inequities.168 In stable democracies, “there 
is widespread social acceptance of the authority of the branches of 
government, including the judiciary.”169 However, in transitional 
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societies, multiple sources of authority may operate 
simultaneously,170 causing people to “openly question and challenge 
the new [political order] both as a general matter and in regard to 
dealing with past wrongs.”171 After Brown I, much of the 
resistance’s enmity was aimed at the federal judiciary, challenging 
the authority of the lower federal courts to implement 
desegregation, shunning and denouncing judges who were 
perceived as sympathetic to desegregation, and attacking the 
Court’s authority to invalidate Jim Crow segregation.172 Faced with 
this massive resistance from multiple governmental and non-
governmental sources—governors, mayors, local school boards, and 
White parents opposing segregated schools—and the equally 
massive campaign to sustain the new sociopolitical order by the 
NAACP, Dr. King, and other champions of desegregation—
American society was plagued by fundamental uncertainties about 
who had the authority to invalidate segregation.173 The resistance 
consisted not only of overtly violent groups, such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, but “respected elements in [W]hite society—governors, 
legislators, U.S. senators, congressmen, and even more tepidly, the 
president of the United States.”174 However, one of the most well-
known political attacks on the Supreme Court’s authority came 
from nineteen Senators and eighty-one House of Representatives 
members who signed what is popularly known as the Southern 
Manifesto.175 Denouncing Brown I as an abuse of judicial authority 
and a violation of the separation of powers and other democratic 
principles, its signatories grounded their objection in an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that implicitly 
endorsed segregation, noting that “[t]he very Congress which 
proposed the amendment subsequently provided for segregated 
schools in the District of Columbia.”176 When viewed in its totality, 
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the massive resistance to Brown I supports the argument that it 
triggered the beginning of a transitional period in American society 
characterized by fundamental uncertainty about authority. 
B. The Transitional Deficiencies of Brown I and the Court’s 
Desegregation Jurisprudence 
Because Brown I triggered the beginning of a transitional 
period in American society and in its system of public education, the 
United States government had an equitable duty to establish a 
comprehensive remedial framework to repudiate deeply entrenched 
attitudes and stereotypes about Black inferiority during the 
desegregation of American schools. However, unlike the South 
African government’s endorsement of transitional justice practices 
in its transition from apartheid,177 the United States government 
underutilized the array of transitional practices at its disposal such 
as truth and reconciliation commissions, executive and legislative 
fact-finding initiatives,178 and museums to redress government 
sanctioned White supremacy that normalized the human rights 
violations of Jim Crow segregation. This underutilization caused 
profound deficiencies in the transition from segregation. DeGruy 
attributes the South African government’s endorsement of the 
SATRC as a significant factor in defusing some of the animosity, 
bitterness, and racial division in post-apartheid South Africa.179 
The Federal Government’s lack of accountability for slavery and the 
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neo-slavery of Jim Crow segregation, according to DeGruy, has 
become pathological. Such denial has allowed this illness to fester 
for almost 400 years. It is what keeps this country sick with this 
issue of race.”180 Acclaimed journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates echoes 
DeGruy’s observations: “Until we reckon with our compounding 
moral debts, America will never be whole . . . .What I’m talking 
about is more than recompense . . . .What is needed is a healing of 
the American psyche.”181 DeGruy’s and Coates’s lamentations 
highlight the difficulty of reconciliation in transitional societies. 
According to Yamamoto, “[R]econciliation initiated does not signal 
social healing achieved. Reconciliation is a long-term, multi-faceted 
political, social, and economic process. It bears potential not only for 
significant legal and social benefits but also for incompleteness and 
even regression.”182 When considered within a conceptual 
framework of reconciliation that envisions sustained, multi-faceted 
responses to past human rights abuses, the limited scope of the 
federally-endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives 
referenced in Part II attests to the reconciliatory deficiencies in the 
nation’s transition from segregation. 
The Federal Government’s reliance on the rule of law as the 
exclusive vehicle for eradicating stereotypes about Black inferiority 
also attests to the reconciliatory deficiencies in the nation’s 
transition from segregation. Because of pervasive structural 
inequalities in transitional societies, “promoting the rule of law is 
insufficient for restoring or establishing political relationships 
among equals.”183 Consequently, changing the law without 
adequately addressing stereotypes of Black inferiority at the root of 
Jim Crow segregation left these stereotypes firmly intact in the 
hearts and minds of the nation184 and guaranteed a weak 
transitional framework that ultimately resulted in the 
 
 180. Id.; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 16 (1993) 
(highlighting the hypocrisy of Americans who “have been quick to criticize the 
apartheid system of South Africa . . . have been reluctant to acknowledge the 
consequences of their own institutionalized system of racial separation”); Norman C. 
Amaker, The Haunting Presence of the Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 20 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 3, 7–8 (1995) (“[N]ever in our history as a people have any of us, [B]lack 
or [W]hite, been ‘neutral’ on the matter of race. It has been, and remains, the great 
overriding issue throughout all our history, in all our law, in all our institutions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 181. Coates, supra note 58. 
 182. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 116. 
 183. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 130. 
 184. JULIE KAILIN, ANTIRACIST EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 42 (2002). 
 
2020] Getting at the Root 35 
abandonment of integration as an educational policy.185 Although 
transitional justice had not yet emerged as a remedial discipline 
when the Brown cases were decided, its emphasis on healing 
“hearts and minds” to nurture a set of cultural values that would 
prevent the re-emergence of attitudes of Black inferiority at the root 
of de jure segregation was a familiar concept to the Court, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of the phrase in its opinion.186 
Furthermore, President Dwight Eisenhower warned Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, Brown I’s author, of the difficulties of supplanting 
almost ninety years of segregation, supposedly remarking that “law 
and force cannot change a man’s heart.”187 Ironically, the challenge 
of changing “hearts and minds” was one of the central arguments of 
those who resisted desegregation.188 The Court’s awareness of the 
necessity of changing hearts and minds and its subsequent failure 
to construct a transitional framework for combating the societal 
notions of Black inferiority is particularly troubling in a case that 
holds “near sacred status in the annals of [S]upreme [C]ourt 
jurisprudence.”189 The discussion that follows explores the 
transitional deficiencies in the Brown cases and in notable cases in 
the Supreme Court’s desegregation jurisprudence. 
1. Brown I Perpetuates Stereotypes of Black Intellectual 
Inferiority and the Relational Inequalities of Jim Crow 
In commenting on the significance of the Brown cases, one 
scholar observed that “[i]t is difficult to criticize a case that no 
longer stands for a legal point, becoming instead a central part of 
the social mythology of the country.”190 A central part of that social 
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mythology is what these cases have come to symbolize to the 
dominant culture: the end of racism and legally sanctioned inequity 
in public schools.191 And, according to another scholar, “[t]he older 
Brown gets, the more unwilling white society is to explore our 
history and its connection to modern racism and inequality.”192 
When these sentiments are juxtaposed with the sentiments of 
others for whom the cases are a source of enduring sadness, 
disappointment, and even bitterness,193 an ethos about the 
elusiveness of educational equity emerges that was eloquently 
summarized by Cornel West who opined that America was at its 
best in Brown I and at its worst in Brown II.194 These divergent 
interpretations about the significance of the Brown cases attest to 
their transitional deficiencies. Authored by activist justices with the 
political agenda of repudiating segregation, Brown I is an 
extraordinary example of a transitional judicial opinion that 
announced transformative, revolutionary rules that changed 
America’s legal, cultural, and educational landscape. Brown I 
repudiated Plessy’s195 distinction between the political rights 
guaranteed by the equal protection clause and the civil and social 
equality of Black Americans that ignored the reality of the post-
reconstruction South that had begun nullifying the mandates of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their 
promises of full legal inclusion for Black Americans.196 In stark 
contrast, Brown I was a political decision; the Court did not ignore 
the sociopolitical context of the Cold War or the hypocrisy of 
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endorsing segregation while simultaneously promoting the nation 
as an exemplar of the liberalizing values of democracy.197 
However, Brown I’s political nature was also the source of its 
inherent weakness, one that would not be corrected in the Court’s 
desegregation jurisprudence and that ultimately contributed to 
profound reconciliatory deficiencies in the nation’s transition from 
segregation. Brown I’s transitional deficiencies are rooted in the 
Court’s superficial analysis of the stigma rationale that replicated 
the imbalanced relationships of Jim Crow segregation. In 
transitional societies, rules of law embedded in judicial opinions are 
narratives that create a framework for transforming relationships 
once characterized by pervasive structural inequalities into 
egalitarian ones where historically marginalized groups are 
treated, not as outsiders, but encouraged to fully participate as 
equals in the political community.198 Eradicating stereotypes is 
another key function of effective transitional judicial narratives.199 
Unaddressed stereotypes can contribute to pervasive structural 
inequality, resulting in a diminution of agency and reciprocity 
among the targeted group that invites ridicule by the dominant 
society that, if internalized, diminishes that group’s ability to 
meaningfully contribute to society.200 
Jim Crow segregation was a sociopolitical regime premised on 
a wide range of stereotypes201 that purportedly justified the 
pervasive structural inequalities that subordinated Black 
Americans in all aspects of their lives.202 A key aspect of that 
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subordination was Black intellectual inferiority, an ideology 
premised on pseudo-scientific theories that claimed to conclusively 
establish the intellectual superiority of White Americans.203 These 
pseudo-scientific theories would, according to one scholar, “make 
race the crucial determinant of human progress or 
retrogression . . . [and] had the effect of weeding out people of color 
from the ranks of those considered ‘able’ or ‘intelligent.’”204 As this 
stratification of the races based on intellectual ability continued, 
Black Americans would increasingly become defined as 
“permanent, degraded outsiders.”205 These notions of Black 
intellectual inferiority and outsider status would become deeply 
engrained into the fabric of American education during slavery and 
segregation, and consequently “[t]he history of American education 
is a history of . . . continuous struggle by African-Americans to be 
educated for first-class rather than for second-class citizenship.”206 
Theories of Black intellectual inferiority were also engrafted 
into the Constitution by the Supreme Court’s infamous decisions in 
Dred Scott207 and Plessy208 that dehumanized and objectified Black 
Americans.209 These theories of Black intellectual inferiority would 
also be engrafted into Brown I.210 Under the Warren Court’s stigma 
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rationale, Black students were the lone injured parties; according 
to the Court, “Segregation . . . has a detrimental effect on the colored 
children” that “has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some 
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school 
system.”211 However, by identifying Black students as the only 
parties injured by de jure segregation, the Court assumed that 
White students were not injured by segregation and that notions of 
White supremacy were not injurious to the egalitarian ideals of 
democracy,212 assumptions likely grounded in notions of White 
Supremacy deeply engrained in American society.213 Given societal 
attitudes of Black inferiority extant in the larger society and 
acknowledged in Brown I, the Warren Court most likely could not 
imagine a scenario where White students would derive any benefit 
from exposure to Black students who society deemed intellectually 
inferior.214 
The assumptions at the root of the Court’s stigma rationale 
perpetuated the outsider narrative inherent in stereotypes of Black 
intellectual inferiority. The Court’s analysis was framed narrowly; 
the only relevant inquiry was the intangible consequences of de jure 
segregated schools, not the tangible disparities in funding, 
infrastructure investment, and low teacher-to-student ratios that 
plagued pre-integration Black schools.215 Given the narrowness of 
its analysis, the Court’s declaration that segregation deprived Black 
students of “some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] 
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integrated school system,”216 suggests that the only remedy for 
Black students’ stigmatic injuries was proximity to the intangible 
benefits readily available to White students in their school 
environment.217 By casting Black students as outsiders in need of 
redemption by proximity to White students, the Court’s transitional 
narrative exacerbated the pervasive structural inequalities of de 
jure segregation, reinforcing the racial hierarchies of segregation 
where Black Americans were treated as outsiders at the bottom of 
“a hierarchy of humanity that placed Whiteness at the top and 
Blackness at the bottom.”218 Once labelled as psychologically 
injured outsiders, Black students would be impaired in their ability 
to fully participate as equals in integrated schools and become 
vulnerable to overt or covert ridicule by White students, teachers, 
and school administrators. 
Furthermore, Brown I’s stigma rationale replicated the 
imbalanced relationships of Jim Crow segregation by promoting an 
assimilationist model for desegregation. The history of Black 
education did not begin in 1954, although that is the date when 
issues of educational equity most likely entered into the nation’s 
collective consciousness.219 Beginning in slavery when teaching 
Blacks to read was a crime,220 Whites used education, or the lack 
thereof, to subordinate Black Americans, a practice that, according 
to one civil rights historian “remained virtually unchanged well into 
the twentieth century.”221 Although the dominant culture used 
education as a tool of subordination, Black Americans used 
education as a shield “to lead people toward what was considered 
their historic responsibility—[building] a better, more just and 
decent society.”222 However, this rich tradition of Black education is 
 
 216. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 217. See Williams, supra note 120, at 181, 182–84 (summarizing critiques of the 
Court’s stigma rationale for its assumptions of Black inferiority) (alteration in 
original). 
 218. See Our Story, supra note 138. 
 219. See KAILIN, supra note 184, at 34 (observing that Brown I was “the first time 
the U.S. government made a formal commitment to include Blacks in the promise of 
educational equity”); SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 214, at 63 “[T]he cruelty with 
which [W]hite Americans have dealt with [B]lack Americans has been compounded 
by the callousness with which white historians have dealt with Black history.”). 
 220. See Literacy as Freedom, SMITHSONIAN AM. ART MUSEUM, http://americanex
perience.si.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Literacy-as-Freedom.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SEY2-UBXZ] (“After the slave revolt led by Nat Turner in 1831, all slave states 
except Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee passed laws against teaching slaves to 
read and write.”). 
 221. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 45. 
 222. See KAILIN, supra note 184, at 35. 
 
2020] Getting at the Root 41 
often overlooked in the scholarly discourse and in the nation’s 
collective memory.223 In critiquing the conspicuous absence of 
scholarly inquiry into the complexities of Jim Crow segregation, 
historian Tomiko Brown-Nagin observed that “the tendency among 
scholars . . . is to view the pre-Brown period exclusively through the 
lens of deprivation, as if the Court’s stigma rhetoric accurately 
described the complex reality of human experience during this 
era.”224 Historian Vanessa Siddle Walker makes similar 
observations about narratives of deprivation commonly ascribed to 
pre-integration Black schools, observing that: 
 
In this national memory, southern African Americans were 
victims of [W]hites who questioned the utility of providing 
[B]lacks with anything more than a rudimentary 
education . . . . The children suffered immeasurably and, the 
memory assumes, received little of educational value until they 
were desegregated into the superior [W]hite systems.225 
 
Walker argues that “to remember segregated schools largely 
by recalling only their poor resources presents a historically 
incomplete picture.”226 A more complete, historical picture of pre-
integration Black schools developed by Walker and scholars such as 
Faustine Jones, Thomas Sowell, and Adam Fairclough depicts a 
school environment characterized by high teacher expectations, 
academic rigor, and psychological support even amidst the 
disparities in funding, infrastructure investment, and teacher-to-
student ratios that characterized the pervasive structural 
inequalities of Jim Crow segregation.227 And in the collective 
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memories of those educated in pre-integration Black schools, they 
were cherished institutions whose educational mission was to 
prevent Black children from internalizing societal attitudes about 
their intellectual inferiority and to help them cultivate the skills 
necessary for leading purposeful, meaningful lives even amidst Jim 
Crow’s repression.228 
But the legacy of pre-integration Black schools was obscured 
by the Court’s stigma rationale. Although acknowledging the 
“outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the 
business and professional world” of many Black Americans, the 
Court did not explicitly attribute these successes to pre-integration 
Black schools.229 The absence of historical context contributed to the 
Court’s superficial analysis which assumed that all Black students 
were monolithic, that they experienced segregation in the same 
way, and that the dominant culture’s attitudes about Black 
intellectual inferiority were always internalized by Black 
students.230 Although some Black children certainly internalized 
societal attitudes about their intellectual inferiority despite the 
protective strategies devised by their teachers,231 all of them did not 
experience the psychological trauma that segregation was assumed 
to elicit.232 And the existence of any psychologically-resilient Black 
children233 amidst the repression of Jim Crow segregation is directly 
attributable to the mission of pre-integration Black schools.234 
When considered within the context of societal attitudes of Black 
intellectual inferiority, the absence of historical context in Brown I 
suggested that Black students “received little of educational value 
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until they were desegregated into the superior [W]hite systems.”235 
Thus, the legacy of pre-integration Black schools as cherished 
cultural institutions that anchored the lives of Black students 
during segregation was obfuscated in the nation’s collective 
memory.236 When viewed in its totality, Brown I replicated the 
relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation by implicitly 
endorsing an outsider narrative, obfuscating the legacy of pre-
integration Black schools, and facilitating the adoption of an 
assimilationist model for school desegregation. 
2. The Court’s Desegregation Jurisprudence Replicates 
Relational Inequities and Undermines Integration 
The relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation inherent in 
Brown I’s transitional narrative guaranteed a weak transitional 
framework for desegregation. The Warren Court’s strategy of 
staking societal transformation on the sympathy of Whites in its 
effort to redeem psychologically damaged Black children was a 
weak foundation for societal transformation because it reinforced 
the “outsider-insider” narrative at the root of White supremacy. 
Brown I’s “outsider-insider” transitional narrative allowed, as 
Sharon Rush observes, “[W]hite society to continue to function, 
often subconsciously, on the myth of [W]hite superiority even as it 
officially and consciously denounced the myth of [B]lack 
inferiority.”237 In Brown II, the Court exacerbated the relational 
inequities of Brown I’s transitional narrative by crafting a vague 
remedial framework that left deeply entrenched attitudes about 
Black intellectual inferiority unaddressed. The Court acknowledged 
the complexities of fashioning a remedy for “reconciling public and 
private needs” and recognized the importance of eliminating “a 
variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems 
operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth 
in [Brown I].”238 However, beyond the cryptic “all deliberate speed” 
language, Brown II offered no practical guidance for the transition 
and no precise methodology for dismantling institutionalized 
attitudes of White supremacy that spawned ninety years of de jure 
segregated schools.239 Under this laissez-faire approach to school 
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desegregation, it would take ten years before the Court 
acknowledged the failures of Brown II’s remedial formula.240 
However, its nascent desegregation jurisprudence would also 
replicate the relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation. In Green 
v. County School Board of New Kent County,241 the Court declared 
its intent to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation “root and 
branch.”242 However, its exclusive focus on six tangible factors of the 
school environment such as student assignments, transportation, 
and facilities as the lodestar of desegregation was at odds with the 
intangible stigmatic injury of de jure segregation identified in 
Brown I.243 This omission implicitly repudiated the stigma 
rationale, implying that it was more legal abstraction than a 
commitment to eliminating stereotypes of Black intellectual 
inferiority at the root of de jure segregation. 
Furthermore, once desegregation began in earnest, local 
school boards implemented integration in ways that replicated the 
relational inequities of Jim Crow by obfuscating the distinct 
educational ethos of the pre-integration Black schools and the 
cultural legacy of Black educators. The initial burst of enthusiasm 
that some Black educators felt in the immediate aftermath of Brown 
I244 would morph into the kind of skepticism that ultimately caused 
legendary educator Dr. Horace Tate to believe that the Brown cases 
promised only a “second-class citizenship.”245 This second class 
citizenship would manifest itself in the closing of many pre-
integration Black schools246 and in the termination of thousands of 
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Black educators.247 Historians estimate that between 1954 and 
1972 more than 31,000 Black teachers lost their jobs and that a 
staggering “96% of African-American principals lost their jobs in 
North Carolina, 90% in Kentucky and Arkansas, 80% in Alabama, 
78% in Virginia, and 77% in South Carolina and Tennessee.”248 
Educators who avoided termination were often demoted or given 
nominal positions.249 These terminations echoed Brown I’s 
assimilationist narrative by perpetuating the paternalistic belief 
that “closing [B]lack schools, terminating African-American 
teachers, and demoting [B]lack principals . . . [were] reasonable 
sacrifices to increase the quality of education for all students, 
especially the [B]lack ones.”250 Some influential members of the 
NAACP and the Black community expressed similar sentiments, 
viewing the loss of Black educators as justified by the “onward 
march of progress.”251 
This myopic view of progress resulted in the kind of 
deculturization that North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges and 
other Southern governors used to thwart desegregation.252 
However, the loss of a distinct educational aesthetic, culturally 
sustaining educational spaces253 and a cohort of Black educators 
was most precipitously borne by Black students.254 During de jure 
segregation, “public schools acted as agencies of race sentiment and 
community identity.”255 The Black community “took ‘ownership’ of 
schools . . . . These were not only places where students went to 
learn; these were places that belonged to the community as a source 
of pride, leadership, development, and acculturation.”256 Ironically, 
as Black educators were whittled from the ranks of what would 
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become an increasingly White teaching cadre,257 their distinct 
cultural mission of empowerment would be lost in an 
assimilationist educational model that “viewed [B]lack teachers as 
inferior and [B]lack schools as ‘too [B]lack’ for [W]hite children.”258 
Fairclough notes that in the Black community “a strong sense of 
providential mission promoted the belief that God had given 
educated [B]lacks the duty of redeeming their race” and this 
providential mission contributed to the belief among educators that 
“[i]n the hands of the Negro teachers rests the destiny of the 
race.”259 For Black teachers, the relational aspects of the pre-Brown 
school environment—quasi-parental relationships with students 
that included driving students to cultural events, helping them get 
scholarships, understanding family dynamics, and providing food 
and clothing when necessary—gave students the confidence to 
advocate for themselves and their communities, preparing them for 
the day when Black Americans would acquire the agency and 
autonomy to assume their rightful role as valuable participants in 
American democracy.260And consequently, Walker describes Black 
educators as hidden provocateurs who defied the subversive intent 
of Jim Crow by formulating and implementing educational policies 
tailored for the unique needs of Black students and for the 
liberatory goals of the Black community.261 Given the civic ideals at 
the heart of their professional identity, Black educators who 
embraced integration did so with the hope that it would ensure 
more equitable, agentic educational opportunities for Black 
students and embody what Dr. King described as: “[Genuine] 
integration . . . where there is shared power . . . not Negro 
annihilation.”262 However, because integration obfuscated the 
legacy of Black educators within a distinct educational ethos, Black 
students did not receive a genuine integration but one that 
“undermin[ed] the position of the [Black] teacher as a mentor, role 
model, and disciplinarian.”263 And consequently, during the era of 
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active enforcement of desegregation, the quid pro quo for the 
“progress” of integration was the elimination of a distinct, Black 
educational ethos and the cultural legacy of Black educators. 
As the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence matured, it 
continued to replicate the relational inequities of Jim Crow by 
shifting its transitional narrative from one of paternalism and 
assimilation to one of acquiescence and accommodation, resulting 
in the resegregation of the nation’s schools and the abandonment of 
integration as an educational policy. This narrative shift resulted 
from the Court’s unwillingness to recognize that attitudes about 
Black inferiority reflected in decades of government sanctioned 
policies and manifesting themselves in new, more modern social 
phenomena, such as White flight, housing discrimination, and 
racially segregated housing patterns were vestiges of the 
attitudinal remnants of de jure segregation. The Court’s 
acquiescence to new, more modern manifestations of de jure 
segregation began in Milliken v. Bradley,264 a case that civil rights 
scholars characterize as the death knell for meaningful 
desegregation.265 Milliken was the first case to comprehensively 
address the constitutionality of remedial efforts to ameliorate the 
reemergence of racially isolated schools amid shifting 
demographics.266 The Court held that busing students between the 
predominately White suburban Detroit school districts and the 
predominately Black inner-city schools to redress de jure 
segregation in Detroit exceeded Brown II’s remedial mandate.267 
Although the record established that the State of Michigan and its 
Board of Education facilitated the White flight that caused racially 
identifiable suburban schools,268 the Milliken Court nevertheless 
demanded additional evidence that jurisdictional boundaries were 
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gerrymandered to thwart desegregation or that the suburban school 
districts contributed to the de jure segregation of Detroit public 
schools.269 By refusing to impute attitudes of Black inferiority 
extant in the larger society and sanctioned by the State of Michigan 
and its department of education onto suburban school districts 
despite clear evidence of the segregative impact of those policies, 
the Court repudiated the Warren Court’s stigma rationale.  Unlike 
the Warren Court that placed the blame of Black inferiority on local 
school boards,270 Chief Justice Warren Burger absolved the 
suburban schools districts, casting them as victims while ignoring 
the stigmatic injuries of state-sanctioned policies of racial isolation 
at the heart of the constitutional injury recognized in Brown I.271 
The Court’s narrative shift toward acquiescence and 
accommodation would intensify during the 1990s under the 
leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in a group of cases 
described by scholars as the “resegregation trilogy.”272 In Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,273 the Court 
disregarded irrefutable evidence that the board’s neighborhood 
school assignment policy would result in more than 50% of the city’s 
schools becoming either predominantly Black or White.274 Touting 
the benefits of local control and disregarding decades of federal and 
state sanctioned housing discrimination that facilitated racially 
segregated neighborhoods,275 the Court held that the relevant 
inquiry for dissolving a desegregation decree was whether “the 
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent 
practicable,”276 reasoning that court ordered supervision was “not 
intended to operate in perpetuity.”277 The last two cases in the 
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resegregation trilogy, Freeman v. Pitts278 and Missouri v. Jenkins,279 
also involved the complexities of court ordered supervision amid 
shifting racial demographics.280 In Freeman, shifting racial 
demographics created predominantly White schools in the northern 
area of the county and predominately Black schools in the southern 
portion.281 In addressing the county’s shifting demographics, the 
Court acknowledged the relationship between residential 
segregation and school segregation,282 the historical record of “[p]ast 
wrongs to the [B]lack race . . . committed by the State,” and the 
existence of “stubborn facts of history [that] linger and persist.”283 
But it nevertheless held that the county’s racially isolated schools 
were not vestiges of de jure discrimination, reasoning that “though 
we cannot escape our history, neither must we overstate its 
consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.”284 However, the Court 
did not explicitly address the county’s history of residential 
segregation and blockbusting285 alluded to by the district court286 or 
provide any historical justification for its conclusion about the 
absence of a causal link between demographic changes and prior de 
jure segregation. Notably, Justice Souter’s concurrence explored 
alternate ways of establishing the causal connection that were 
overlooked by the majority, observing that a causal link to de jure 
segregation could be established based on “past school segregation 
and the patterns of thinking that segregation creates.”287 
The Court’s emphasis on the importance of local control amid 
changing racial demographics was also reflected in Jenkins. The 
desegregation plan at issue in that case sought to remedy the de 
jure segregation in Kansas City public schools by requiring the 
school board to engage in various initiatives designed not only to 
improve educational opportunities within the district but to 
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increase the overall attractiveness of Kansas City public schools to 
White students enrolled in suburban school districts.288 In 
invalidating the board’s proactive pedagogical approach which 
sought to equalize inner-city schools with their suburban 
counterparts, the Court reasoned that educational initiatives to 
increase the public schools’ “desegregative attractiveness” violated 
the Milliken’s prohibition on inter-district segregation remedies to 
redress vestiges of de jure segregation in a single district.289 
Additionally, according to scholar Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, 
“[t]he Jenkins decision made clear that the Supreme Court would 
not uphold efforts to make racially isolated schools equal by 
improving the educational programming in segregated schools and 
thus effectively abandoned even a return to Plessy’s ‘separate but 
equal’ doctrine.”290 
The collective impact of the Milliken decision and the 
Rehnquist Court’s resegregation trilogy was twofold. First, it 
replicated the relational inequities of Jim Crow by adopting a 
specious distinction between de facto and de jure segregation that 
ignored the causal link between de jure segregation and decades of 
federal and state polices that sanctioned housing discrimination 
and racially discriminatory lending practices that stripped Black 
families of mobility and agentic educational opportunities available 
to their White counterparts. As Lawrence observes, “[t]he injury of 
segregation is found in its social meaning.”291 The repudiation of 
segregation means nothing if it results in the same social context at 
the root of de jure segregation: a dichotomy between civil and social 
equality resulting in a diminution of agency and reciprocity among 
the targeted group that invites ridicule by the dominant society.292 
Furthermore, the Court’s impairment of Black families’ 
associational and mobility interests is premised on untenable 
assumptions. The Court simply assumed that some degree of racial 
isolation was permissible as the inevitable result of private choices 
or societal discrimination, not the inevitable result of decades of 
federal and state sanctioned racially-defined home lending 
practices such as mortgage redlining, racially restrictive covenants, 
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blockbusting, and federal highway and urban renewal projects that 
subsidized the development of White suburbs while erecting 
highway infrastructure that displaced Black households and 
separated White and Black neighborhoods.293 However, in Freeman, 
the Court typically reached its conclusions about the absence of a 
causal link between demographic changes and prior de jure 
segregation without any comprehensive historical justification. In 
commenting on the specious distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation, noted scholar Richard Rothstein observed that “State 
action played not a minor, but the major role, more influential than 
‘societal discrimination’ or ‘private choices.’ . . . [However,] [t]his 
argument has rarely been forcefully presented to the courts, partly 
because the history of state-sponsored segregation has been 
forgotten, even suppressed.”294 The absence of a historical record 
and the difficulties that it poses in school desegregation cases was 
also acknowledged by Justice Anthony Kennedy who opined that 
“[t]he distinction between government and private action . . . can be 
amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-
day finding of fact.”295 Rothstein’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
observations are consistent with principles of transitional justice 
that emphasize the importance of creating a historical record of past 
government sanctioned wrongdoing and highlight the ways that 
societal transformation can be thwarted by its absence. 
Second, the Rehnquist Court’s resegregation trilogy led to the 
demise of integration as an educational policy and to a system of 
public education that is even more racially segregated than it was 
in 1968.296 The isolation of Black students within a social context of 
White resistance to desegregation and racial stereotypes evokes 
“the story that segregation tells to [B]lack children and to the rest 
of us . . . in its designation of a superior and an inferior caste.”297 
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Many of the nation’s largest inner-city school districts are almost 
without exception, non[W]hite and increasingly segregated.”298 
Furthermore, according to a 2017 analysis by the UCLA Civil 
Rights Project, “75[%] [B]lack students attend majority minority 
schools, while 38[%] go to schools that are less than 10[%] 
[W]hite.”299 One particularly ominous aspect of the reemergence of 
racially-segregated schools is the correlation between de facto 
school segregation and an overall decrease in the availability and 
quality of resources accessible to racially segregated schools serving 
predominately Black and Latinx students.300 Racially-segregated, 
overwhelmingly minority public schools “are characterized by 
poorer test scores, less-experienced teachers, and fewer resources 
than the public schools most [W]hite children attend.”301 In addition 
to these aspects of the school environment, racially segregated 
schools with high concentrations of minority students often have 
fewer of the resources that are so vital to college and vocational 
readiness, such as “college preparation curricula, higher-level 
science and math courses, or guidance counselors.”302 This 
convergence of independent factors that result in decreased 
educational opportunities for minority students in comparison with 
their White peers is the functional equivalent of de jure segregation. 
As constitutional law scholar Charles Daye so eloquently explains, 
“[h]ow can equal protection not mean equality in fact? It takes a 
lawyer to explain best how things can be legally equal but not equal 
in any factual sense.”303 The Court’s narrow interpretation of its 
remedial power ensured that the relational inequities of Jim Crow 
would remain unaddressed and that the nation’s system of public 
education would remain in a perennial state of transition. 
Consequently, the subtle and not so subtle messages that continue 
to exist about Black intellectual inferiority some sixty-five years 
after Brown persist in the sub-text of our nation’s history, collective 
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III. Jim Crow’s Ideology of Black Intellectual Inferiority 
Haunts a New Generation: Stereotype Threat, Stigma 
Threat, and the Soft Bigotry of Low Teacher 
Expectations 
 
Somebody told a lie one day. . . . They made everything Black, 
ugly and evil. 
—Martin Luther King, Jr.304 
 
Dr. King’s quote alludes to the intransigence of attitudes about 
Black inferiority that continues to resonate in the nation’s 
consciousness. As demonstrated by the analysis in the preceding 
section, stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority were not 
eradicated during the sociopolitical shift from segregation. Instead, 
Brown I’s transitional narrative of paternalism and assimilation, 
Brown II’s vague remedial framework, and the Court’s narrative 
shift in the 1990s toward acquiescence and accommodation focused 
on desegregation without striking at stereotypes of Black 
intellectual inferiority at the root of segregation. Because of these 
transitional deficiencies, integration did not remedy decades of 
racially stereotypical thinking about the ability of Black students. 
Dr. King’s vision of a genuine integration did not occur, and 
consequently, many Black students find themselves in a double-
bind: either marginalized and subordinated within predominately 
White schools305 or isolated from their White peers without 
culturally sustaining educational spaces or the protective strategies 
for psychological resilience embodied in the legacy of pre-
integration Black schools. Professor Charles Lawrence poignantly 
describes the double-bind that many modern-day Black students 
experience: 
 
Today, African American students live in a more confusing 
world.  They experience the slights, stereotypes, and exclusions 
of racism, but civil rights laws have made racial discrimination 
illegal, and most [W]hite Americans embrace the ideal of racial 
equality. Yet, these laws have eliminated neither the structures 
of racism nor the beliefs and practices that whisper stories of 
inherent inferiority in young people’s ears.306 
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Consistent with Lawrence’s observations, whispers of Black 
intellectual inferiority manifest themselves in the modern-day 
phenomena of stereotype and stigma threat.307 Stereotype threat is 
a well-documented educational phenomenon first articulated by 
psychologists Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson. It explains how 
pervasive negative intellectual stereotypes and a student’s 
awareness of these stereotypes trigger anxiety, fear, and distraction 
that negatively impact academic performance.308 According to 
psychologists, children become aware of others’ stereotypes about 
them between the ages of six and eleven, and thus “by early 
adolescence, most children have developed knowledge of broadly 
held stereotypes.”309 Although initially developed to explain 
impaired performance among Black students in college testing 
environments, researchers have determined that stereotype threat 
can be observed in secondary education settings by any group 
subject to pervasive stereotypes of low academic ability, and 
triggered by any task capable of confirming a negative stereotype 
about a group’s intellectual ability.310 These tasks include 
performance on standardized tests and aspects of academic 
engagement such as participating in classroom discussions, 
interacting with peers, or pursuing post-secondary education 
opportunities.311 Paradoxically, highly-motivated students who are 
most invested in academics and whose academic engagement 
should enhance their performance are most vulnerable to 
stereotype threat.312 Stereotype threat “initiates a cascade of events 
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leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy” that has life-altering academic 
consequences.313 For example, some of “[t]he most rigorous 
estimates suggest that stereotype threat accounts for a substantial 
proportion of racial achievement gaps.”314 
Stigma threat is another equally pernicious, but lesser known 
way that the nation’s schools remain plagued by the attitudinal 
remnants of Jim Crow segregation. In stark contrast to stereotype 
threat, stigma threat is the external manifestation of negative 
racial stereotypes in the school environment.315 If unchecked, 
stigma threat results in racially hostile educational environments 
where Black students and other racial minorities affected by 
stereotypes of intellectual deficiency feel isolated and unwelcome.316 
Implicit racial bias among teachers, another feature of racially 
hostile educational environments, “is one of the biggest barriers to 
closing the achievement gap between [W]hite children and students 
of color, particularly those who come from low-income homes.”317 
Noted author Verna Myers defines implicit bias as “the stories we 
make up about people before we know who they actually are”318 and 
the term broadly encompasses “the attitudes or stereotypes that 
affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious 
manner.”319 Americans of every race have implicit biases that can 
be exacerbated by the absence of racially and culturally diverse life 
experiences.320 Demographic data about the paucity of interracial 
social interactions, the intransigence of attitudes about Black 
intellectual inferiority, and the shifting racial demographics of the 
nation’s public schools reveal a system of public education that is 
conducive to implicit bias.321 According to one survey, “75[%] of 
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[W]hite Americans have entirely [W]hite social networks[—]an 
experience that results in exaggerated perceptions of difference as 
well as fear and threat.”322 Furthermore, a study conducted during 
the era of the Rehnquist Court revealed that 53% of Whites believed 
that Blacks were not as intelligent, and another study conducted 
during the same period revealed that “37[%] of White Americans 
professed that African Americans are incapable of being motivated 
to learn.”323 Paradoxically, although these statistics substantiate 
the social isolation and existence of attitudinal remnants of Jim 
Crow segregation among Whites, interracial teacher-student 
contact is the norm in American public schools.324 According to 
statistics from the National Education Association (NEA), “the 
overall number of non-White students has surpassed 50[%] while 
White teachers still account for 84[%] of the teaching force in the 
public school system.”325 Given these statistics, it follows that some 
White teachers harbor racial biases that result in the “distorted 
mental frameworks imposed by segregation . . . [that cause them] to 
see members of other racial and ethnic groups as images consistent 
with past ideologies of imposed superiority and oppression rather 
than as authentic individuals.”326 
Implicit bias among White teachers is often manifested in 
what one scholar describes as the “[s]oft [b]igotry of [l]ow 
[e]xpectations.”327 In a policy pronouncement encouraging teacher 
training programs to adopt culturally responsive pedagogical 
practices, the NEA observed that “non-Black teachers have 
significantly lower expectations of Black students . . . [that] can 
unknowingly lead a teacher to change their instructional strategies 
and/or select resources that do not challenge or develop Black 
students’ cognitive or analytical skills.”328 This finding is 
particularly troubling because empirical research reveals that high 
teacher expectations are inextricably linked to academic success 
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among Black students329 and that students perform in ways that 
are consistent with their teacher’s expectations.330 The deleterious 
impact of implicit bias embodied in these statistics was also 
reflected in a 2014 study documenting the effects of racial 
stereotypes on collegiate teacher-student relationships.331 
According to that study, Black students “have higher mistrust of 
teachers than [W]hite students based on the pervasive stigma of 
[B]lack intellectual inferiority . . .  [that can] trigger a ‘social-
cognitive barrier . . . that obscures the meaning of constructive 
feedback and prevents students from learning from it.’”332 These 
findings highlighting the importance of trust in teacher-student 
relationships were substantiated by a 2017 research study which 
found that a caring attitude “is the dimension of student-professor 
interactions responsible for positive academic self-concept among 
African American college students.”333 Acclaimed educator Theresa 
Perry emphasizes the importance of teachers in affirming Black 
students’ identification with schooling and intellectual work, noting 
that: 
[A] child’s belief in the power and importance of schooling and 
intellectual work can be interrupted by teachers . . . who 
explicitly or subtly convey a disbelief in the child’s ability for 
high academic achievement, and the child having a rightful 
place in the larger society—unless a counternarrative about the 
child’s identity as an intellectual being is intentionally passed 
on to him or her.334 
 
Ironically, the counternarrative that Perry references—the 
cornerstone of the educational ethos of pre-integration Black 
schools and the legacy of its Black educators—was obfuscated as the 
quid pro quo for the progress of integration and by the adoption of 
an assimilationist model for school desegregation.335 Given this 
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assimilationist model, public schools are a function of White 
dominant culture.336 And thus Perry contends that “most of our 
educational institutions continue to institutionalize ‘[W]hiteness’ as 
the culture of power.”337 An institutionalized culture of Whiteness, 
according to Perry, means that Black students who do not mimic 
the “subset of those cultural features that represent ‘[W]hiteness’ in 
the American imagination” will lack cultural capital, the socially 
inherited cultural competence necessary for academic 
achievement.338 These cultural features include a reserved 
demeanor and the ability to subordinate emotion to reason, 
constrain physical activity, and present a disciplined exterior.339 
Because Black children without cultural capital manifest 
characteristics that are at odds with the dominant culture, these 
differences can trigger differential treatment which may stem from 
implicit biases about Black intellectual inferiority. Furthermore, 
without the protective strategies for psychological resilience at the 
heart of pre-integration Black schools being reinforced by teachers 
with culturally informed approaches to pedagogy, Black students 
are at risk for not developing psychological buffers that thwart the 
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IV. Moving Toward Attitudinal Transformation: A 
Preliminary Framework for Acknowledging the Legacy 
and Dangers of Racial Stereotyping in American 
Education 
 
History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if 
faced with courage, need not be lived again. 
—Maya Angelou340 
 
The enduring truth of Maya Angelou’s exhortation—
acknowledging the injuries caused by the attitudinal remnants of 
Jim Crow segregation so that they “need not be lived again”—is the 
equitable mandate of transitional justice. However, the Roberts 
Court seems unlikely to rectify the transitional deficiencies at the 
root of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence given its 2007 ruling 
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1341 that invalidated voluntary attempts by school districts to 
create racially-integrated schools. This decision signaled the 
Court’s continued ambivalence to the attitudinal remnants of Jim 
Crow segregation that has resulted in the reemergence of 
segregated public schools.342 Consequently, the Court’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge the relationship between present-day 
issues of educational inequality and the attitudinal remnants of Jim 
Crow segregation will likely continue. Absent a radical, 
transformative paradigmatic shift from the Court—a literal Brown 
2.0—the Federal Government’s reliance on the rule of law as the 
exclusive vehicle for eradicating the attitudinal remnants of Jim 
Crow segregation will continue to perpetuate attitudes of Black 
intellectual inferiority at the root of contemporary issues of 
educational inequality. 
However, several recent high-profile reconciliatory initiatives 
reflect the public’s increasing interest in transitional justice 
practices and its willingness to engage in a national dialogue about 
the relationship between present-day issues of racial inequality and 
the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. Headlines about reparations 
have dominated news cycles, reinvigorating discussion about an 
issue that failed to generate any traction when it entered the 
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national dialogue during the early and mid-2000s343 amid the wave 
of non-federally endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives 
outlined in Part II. 2020 Democratic presidential candidates 
Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, Julián Castro, and Marianne 
Williamson captured national attention by openly discussing the 
issue of reparations in their campaigns.344 Fueled by discourse 
about the possibility of restitution to the descendants of slaves, 
Congress held its first hearing on reparations in more than a decade 
on June 19, 2019, a day of cultural significance in the Black 
community.345 This hearing was the culmination of twenty-eight 
years of legislative activism by former Congressman John Conyers, 
urging Congress to convene a commission to study “subsequent de 
jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against 
African-Americans, and the impact of these forces on living African-
Americans.”346 But the most dramatic example of the public’s 
increasing interest in paradigmatic transitional justice practices is 
the nationally publicized reparations program initiated by 
Georgetown University students in April 2019, benefitting the 
descendants of slaves who were sold in 1838 to pay the University’s 
debts.347 The students’ demand for reparations is the most recent 
reconciliatory effort in a larger campaign to force the University to 
acknowledge its complicity in perpetuating slavery that includes 
1960s-style sit-ins and a demand that the administration rename 
buildings bearing the names of men who orchestrated the sale of 
slaves.348 Prominent private sector institutions have also garnered 
public attention with their efforts to acknowledge the relationship 
between present-day issues of racial inequality and the legacy of 
slavery and Jim Crow. In August 2019, The New York Times 
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launched The 1619 Project, a reference to the year that slaves first 
arrived in the Americas, with a special 100-page edition of its 
Sunday magazine.349 The 1619 Project is ambitious in that it argues 
1619 to be our true founding and “aims to reframe the country’s 
history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions 
of [B]lack Americans at the very center of our national narrative.”350 
The public’s increasing interest in and awareness of 
transitional justice practices can be leveraged by education 
reformers to create a preliminary framework of reconciliatory 
initiatives that could lead to federally endorsed reconciliatory 
initiatives acknowledging the intergenerational impact of nine 
decades of school segregation. This preliminary framework should 
foster three levels of consciousness that roughly correspond to the 
transitional deficiencies of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence: 
(1) acknowledging attitudes of Black inferiority and White 
supremacy at the root of de jure segregation (historical 
consciousness), (2) recognizing the cultural and educational legacy 
of pre-integration Black schools that was obfuscated in the 
transition from segregation (cultural consciousness), and (3) 
connecting attitudinal remnants of de jure segregation to present-
day educational inequalities such as stereotype and stigma threats 
(stereotype consciousness). 
Historical consciousness requires reconciliatory initiatives 
that create national awareness about forgotten aspects of school 
desegregation, that present a more comprehensive, inclusive 
version of that history, and that document the causal connection 
between the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow segregation and 
contemporary issues of educational inequality. Museums, such as 
the National Museum of African American History and Culture, the 
National Memorial for Peace and Justice, and the Emmett Till 
Interpretive Center,351 could become exemplars for commemorative 
spaces that begin the process of societal transformation by 
acknowledging the psychological trauma experienced by children of 
all races during the desegregation of the nation’s schools and the 
intergenerational impact of that psychological trauma. For 
example, community advocates working in conjunction with federal 
agencies such as the National Park Service, national organizations 
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such as the Alliance of African American Museums, and 
international organizations such as the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)352 
could form a coalition to commemorate historic sites related to the 
Prince Edward Free School Association, the federally-funded 
educational initiative launched in 1963 by the Kennedy 
Administration in the wake of the massive resistance to school 
desegregation that closed all of the public schools in Prince Edward 
County, Virginia for five years.353 The Association was “the first 
federal school set up since the Civil War in the South” and was “‘a 
model school system for educationally deprived children,’ open to all 
students regardless of color and funded by private donations.”354 
Generating public awareness about this important chapter in the 
history of school desegregation that has been largely obscured in the 
nation’s collective memory355 could also lead to truth-telling 
initiatives chronicling the lives of the Black students who were 
educated in Association schools and documenting the 
intergenerational impact of the lost educational opportunities on an 
entire generation of Black students in Prince Edward County, 
Virginia. 
These kinds of truth-telling initiatives could also become the 
impetus for documentary films similar to BBDP’s Can We Talk?—
Learning from Boston’s Busing/Desegregation Crisis, which could 
be funded by grassroots community activists, private foundations 
such as the Andrus Family Fund, whose mission is to empower 
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young people of color to community activism,356 or federal agencies 
such as the National Endowment for the Arts that provides funding 
“to sustain artistic traditions of culturally-distinct communities and 
promote the vitality of those traditions.”357 These kinds of films 
have the potential to reach a larger audience and to facilitate truth-
telling initiatives in other areas of the country that examine the 
intergenerational impact of similar educational deprivations that 
occurred during the decade-long period of overt and often violent 
massive resistance to school desegregation. Another equally 
important aspect of historical consciousness is creating a historical 
record that establishes a causal connection between the attitudinal 
remnants of Jim Crow segregation and contemporary issues of 
educational inequality. The same spirit of inquiry that resulted in 
Congressional hearings on reparations could be leveraged to 
petition Congress to conduct a similar inquiry into the causal link 
between decades of federal, state, and local policies sanctioning 
housing discrimination and racially discriminatory lending 
practices that was obfuscated by the Rehnquist Court’s specious 
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, one that led to 
the reemergence of contemporary de facto segregated schools. 
Although closely related to historical consciousness, culturally 
conscious transitional justice practices would focus on educating the 
nation about the distinct Black educational ethos that was 
obfuscated by an assimilationist model for school desegregation. For 
example, grassroots community organizers, in conjunction with 
state and local school boards, could petition Congress to pass a bill 
funding the preservation of significant cultural and historical sites 
related to the legacy of pre-integration Black schools. Culturally 
conscious reconciliatory initiatives should also include the lobbying 
of state and local school boards, state legislatures, and private 
education stakeholders such as the NEA for the adoption of a more 
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culturally inclusive public school curriculum to redress the cultural 
and psychological injuries resulting from the adoption of an 
assimilationist model for school desegregation. This culturally 
inclusive curriculum should depict a more comprehensive view of 
the role of Black Americans in American history, not limited to 
slavery and civil rights, but exploring the cultures and tribes of 
Africa from which these African-Americans descended. This history 
should be integrated throughout the school year and taught in a 
way that presents it as an ongoing narrative of agency, 
empowerment, and resilience, not stigma, victimization, or cultural 
deprivation. Curriculum standards developed by states, such as 
Mississippi358 and Illinois,359 requiring that every public elementary 
school and high school incorporate civil and human rights education 
into its curriculum, could be used as exemplars for the development 
of national curricular standards. 
Lastly, stereotype conscious reconciliatory initiatives should 
direct national attention to the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow 
segregation that manifest themselves in stereotype threat, stigma 
threat, and implicit bias. In May 2019, New York City Schools 
Chancellor Richard Carranza made national headlines when he 
announced that the city would invest approximately $20 million in 
mandatory anti-bias training programs for teachers, 
administrators, and staff.360 School districts in cities, such as Long 
Beach, California and Cleveland, Ohio, have launched similar anti-
bias initiatives.361 Coordinated efforts between private advocacy 
organizations, such as the NEA and the National Alliance of Black 
School Educators, the Department of Education, and its Office for 
Civil Rights, could capitalize on these local efforts by developing a 
national set of standards that would link anti-bias training to 
accreditation and licensing for teacher education programs. 
Furthermore, anti-bias training should be supplemented with some 
of the historically and culturally conscious transitional practices 
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previously referenced so that teachers are “informed about the 
history of racism in schools and various creative forms that 
resistance to racism has taken.”362 
Stereotype conscious reconciliatory initiatives should also 
include educating students, parents, and the nation about how 
stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority perpetuate pervasive 
structural inequalities in the nation’s public schools by putting 
Black and White students on unequal footing in educational 
environments that purport to be a meritocracy: the belief at the 
foundation of American education that academic success is not a 
function of race or social class,363 but “a matter of motivation and 
talent and grit.”364 As previously discussed, stereotypes and implicit 
biases can be exacerbated by the absence of racially and culturally 
diverse life experiences and educational environments. 
Demographic data substantiating the re-emergence of de facto 
racially segregated schools suggests that students would benefit 
from age-appropriate anti-bias and implicit bias training. 
Furthermore, education reformers could also create stereotype 
conscious reconciliatory initiatives that engage students via the 
innovative use of films, storytelling, and interactive media. Several 
cable television networks have begun the process of generating 
public attention about how stereotypes of Black inferiority rooted in 
Jim Crow segregation manifest themselves in the nation’s public 
schools. These could serve as exemplars for stereotype conscious 
transitional justice practices. For example, in 2018, the STARZ 
network debuted America to Me, a ten-part docu-series that 
poignantly depicts how the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow 
segregation manifest themselves in racial divides, stereotypes of 
Black intellectual inferiority, and the implicit biases of well-
meaning teachers at a suburban Chicago high school that is touted 
as a model of successful school integration.365 Wyatt Cenac’s 
Problem Areas, an HBO series that explores polarizing topics in 
contemporary American life, devoted its second season to exploring 
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inequities in the United States’ public education system, including 
the intransigence of stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority.366 
These kinds of films could also lead to cross-racial healing 
initiatives between school districts. For example, school districts 
with large numbers of racially segregated schools could partner 
with racially diverse school districts or predominately White school 
districts to launch cross-racial healing initiatives akin to The 
Welcome Table initiatives highlighted in Part II. These moderated 
cross-racial student dialogues could also become the impetus for the 
innovative use of storytelling, interactive media, and the visual arts 
to challenge students to create self-produced documentaries and 
podcasts to tell their individual stories and to document the stories 
of others in their school communities. 
Conclusion 
Though deeply flawed, Brown I’s enduring legacy is its 
character as a transitional legal rule that “remains a pivotal 
moment in the struggle for racial justice,” triggering a “movement 
that overturned Jim Crow in the South and sparked a 
revolution . . . that transformed America’s social and political 
landscape.”367 However, a society and system of public education in 
perennial transition dishonor Brown I’s equitable imperative as a 
transitional legal rule “to face our past squarely, commit the 
resources necessary to changing the deplorable inequalities of the 
present, and embrace an underlying commitment to substantive 
equality.”368 Furthermore, the Federal Government should 
demonstrate an undaunted commitment to eradicating stereotypes 
of intellectual inferiority at the root of Jim Crow segregation that is 
not premised on altruism or paternalism toward Black Americans 
but on strengthening democracy so that it lives up to its egalitarian 
and liberalizing ideals. In his dissent to Milliken v. Bradley, Justice 
Marshall argued that “unless our children begin to learn together, 
there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together.”369 
Marshall’s argument invokes the inherently political aspect of 
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Brown I that is often obscured in contemporary discussions: the 
threat that de jure segregation and its ideology of Black inferiority 
poses to democratic ideals and to the primary function of public 
education as preparing students of all races to be good citizens.370 
Consequently, as scholar Jerry Rosiek argues so persuasively, 
unaddressed stereotypes and attitudes of Black intellectual 
inferiority are detrimental to the well-being of all students: 
 
[T]hese tacit curricular messages [of inferiority] affect students 
of all races . . . cast into doubt the familiar story, often taught 
in schools, of steady progress toward racial justice . . . [but] 
[p]erhaps most problematically, they normalize racial 
segregation for all students in these schools and make it easier 
to accept it in other parts of their lives.371 
 
If students of all races begin to accept racial segregation as a 
normalized part of United States’ schools and society, societal 
transformation will remain elusive, facilitating what Canadian 
scholars Frances Henry and Carol Tator describe as democratic 
racism that “further[s] the interests, and increase[es] the power, of 
the dominant group while maintaining a veneer of democracy.”372 A 
veneer of democracy perpetuates a Plessy-like dichotomy between 
legal and social equality and creates a separatist world that poses 
the same threat to authentic democracy as it did in 1954. 
 
 370. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 371. Rosiek, supra note 4, at 11. 
 372. Emil Marmol, The Undemocratic Effects and Underlying Racism of 
Standardized Testing in the United States, CRITICAL INTERSECTIONS EDUC., Winter 
2016, at 2. 
